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ABSTRACT 
 
South Africa is facing a major rhino poaching crisis. In 2015, 1175 rhinos were killed by 
poachers and 1054 in 2016.  During the first half of 2017, 529 rhinos had been killed by 
poachers.  South Africa can currently sustain this rate of poaching because the population 
growth rate (approximately 6.5% for white rhino and 5% for black rhino) is higher than the 
off-take (legal and illegal), but if poaching continues to escalate, a tipping point may 
eventually be reached forcing the population to decline for the first time in 50-100 years. 
The driver for the illegal killing is a persistent demand for rhino horn from Asia, where it is 
used mainly for medicinal purposes.  This demand cannot be met by legal supplies because 
international trade in rhino horn was banned by CITES in 1977 in response to long-term, high 
levels of rhino poaching that were threatening to push all rhino species to extinction.   
In 2009, South Africa – as a member of CITES, also banned domestic trade in keeping with 
CITES’ vision and mission. In 2016 the ban on domestic trade was challenged in the case of 
Kruger and Another v Minister of Water and Environmental Affairs. The High Court found 
that the then Minister responsible for environmental affairs (“the Minister”) did not fully 
comply with the public consultation requirements of NEMBA and set aside the moratorium 
with immediate effect.  In February 2017 – following the 2016 High Court judgment – draft 
regulations were published by the Minister effectively setting in motion the legalisation of 
domestic trade in rhino horn. The draft regulations were available for public comment and 
those comments are now being considered by the Minister.  
Despite the regulations still being in draft form, this is a very new development with serious 
consequences for rhinos. This dissertation seeks to analyse the arguments for and against a 
legalised trade.   The draft regulations will also be discussed and their viability – at least on 
paper – will be analysed.   This dissertation will also look at South Africa’s obligations in 
terms of CITES and whether these regulations are in conflict with our obligations to CITES. 
Lastly this dissertation will provide recommendations for the approach that South Africa 
should take.  
The conclusion reached is that the draft regulations appear to address various concerns 
regarding the legalisation of domestic trade, however, they would need to be strengthened in 
order for them to be effective.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1. Statement of purpose 
Against the background of the 2016 High Court judgment of Kruger and Another v Minister 
of Water and Environmental Affairs
1
  and the Draft Regulations for The Domestic Trade in 
Rhinoceros Horn which were published in February 2017,
2
 this dissertation will look at the 
pros and cons of regulating the trade in rhino horn in light of the on-going challenges being 
faced with poaching.  
In 2009, a moratorium on the domestic trade in rhino horn in South Africa was promulgated 
by the Minister in terms of section 57 (2) (a) of the National Environmental Management: 
Biodiversity Act (NEMBA).
3
 This section empowers the Minister to “prohibit the carrying 
out of any activity which is of a nature that may negatively impact on the survival of listed 
threatened or protected species.”4 The moratorium was in the context of section 24 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,
5
 more particularly, paragraph (b) (iii) which is 
aimed at protecting the environment “for the benefit of the present and future generations, 
through reasonable legislative and other measures that secure ecology, sustainable 
development and use of natural resources while promoting justifiable economic and social 
development.”6  
The moratorium placed a ban on domestic trade in rhino horn because rhinos were becoming 
increasingly threatened. In the Kruger case, the applicants – Hume and Kruger, challenged 
the moratorium as well as aspects of the final amendments to the Threatened or Protected 
Species Regulations (TOPS Regulations).
7
 The High Court set the moratorium aside on the 
basis that the public participation requirements of NEMBA were not fully complied with by 
the then Minister. Following the judgment, draft regulations for the domestic trade in rhino 
horn were published by the Minister. 
                                                          
1
 2016 (1) All SA 565 (GP). 
2
 GN 74 of GG 40601, 1 February 2017.  
3
 Act 10 of 2004. 
4
 Ibid, section 57 (2) (a).  
5
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
6
 Ibid, section 24 (b) (iii).   
7
 GN 69 of GG 30703, 28 January 2008.  
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At the outset, it is important to emphasise that the provisions of the 2017 Draft Regulations 
for the Domestic Trade in Rhino Horn have been finalised.
8
 Members of the public were 
invited to comment on the draft regulations and feedback from the public was considered by 
the Minister. However, additional draft regulations were published on 21 September 2018
9
 
(hereinafter referred to as the 2018 draft regulations) which also include regulations that were 
not included in the 2017 regulations.  
A critical discussion of the draft 2017 and 2018 regulations for the trade in rhino horn 
domestically will be provided. The implications of allowing the domestic trade in rhino horn 
in light of South Africa’s international obligations in terms of the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) will also be 
examined.   
 
1.2.The Context of this dissertation 
Loss of genetic diversity is one of the main threats that our planet is facing.
10
 Africa boasts a 
wide range of natural resources, which include land and water as well as minerals, gas and 
wild animals and plants.
11
 Of the world’s natural resources, Africa contains a large amount of 
those resources.
12
 The continent is the second biggest in geographical size and contains the 
second largest human population in the world.
13
 Animals like wildebeest, elephants, giraffes 
and zebras can all be found in Africa which contains over 1000 species of mammals and 60 
species of carnivores which include leopards, lions and cheetahs.
14
  
Assessments have shown that Africa’s environment is experiencing serious pressure at levels 
that are higher than other regions of the world.
15
 The managing of protected areas in Africa is 
                                                          
8
 Department of Environmental Affairs ‘Minister Molewa Highlights Progress on Integrated Strategic 
Management of Rhinoceros’ 25 January 2018 available at: 
https://www.environment.gov.za/mediarelease/molewa_highlightsprogressonimplementationofintegratedstrategi
cmanagementofrhinoceros Accessed on 4 November 2018.  
9
 GN 986 of GG 41919, 21 September 2018. 
10
 UNEP ‘Africa Environment Outlook 2: Our Environment Our Wealth’ 2006 UNEP: Nairobi 4-5. 
11
 UN Environment ‘Our Work in Africa’ Available at: https://www.unenvironment.org/regions/africa/our-
work-africa Accessed on 18 November 2017. 
12
 Ibid.   
13
 R Nichols ‘African Plants and Animals’ Sciencing 25 April 2017 available at: http://sciencing.com/african-
plants-animals-7216765.html Accessed on 18 November 2017.  
14
 UN Environment, note 11 above.  
15
 A Gillespie ‘The Conservation of Wildlife in Africa: Basic Steps for the 21st Century’ (2009) New Zealand 
Journal of Environmental Law 161-188.  
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also becoming a serious concern.
16
 On-going destruction of the environment by humans, 
shortage of food and illnesses are the dangers to the survival of mammals in Africa.
17
  
Rhino poaching in South Africa has increased drastically in recent years. In 2015, 1175 
rhinos’ deaths were caused by poachers and 1054 in 2016.18 During the first half of 2017, 529 
rhinos had been killed by poachers.
19
 According to a 2014 study by the Department of 
Environmental Affairs, the population growth rate for rhinos had thus far exceeded the 
poaching rate.
20
  However, the study indicated that if the poaching rate continued to escalate 
then a ‘tipping point’ could be reached and the rhino population could decline significantly.21 
There is an on-going demand for rhino horn from Asian countries, where it is utilised 
predominantly for medicinal purposes.
22
 However, as CITES prohibits the international trade 
in rhino horn, this demand cannot be met by legal export.
23
 This has served as a catalyst for 
illegal poaching. Furthermore, while the commercial export of rhino horn was prohibited as a 
result of CITES, domestic trade was still permissible.
24
 There were suspicions that Asian 
nationals were trying to circumvent the provisions of CITES by purchasing rhino horn legally 
in South Africa and then exporting those horns illegally to other countries.
25
 This suspected 
wildlife trafficking is what led to the South African government placing a moratorium on the 
domestic trade in rhino horn.
26
 
Wildlife trafficking involves “any environment-related crime that involves illegal trade, 
smuggling, poaching, capture or collection of endangered species, protected wildlife 
                                                          
16
 Ibid. 
17
 P Cheteni ‘An analysis of anti-poaching techniques in Africa: A case of rhino poaching’ (2014) Munich 
Personal RePEc Archive (MPRA).  
18
 Department of Environmental Affairs ‘Minister Molewa Highlights Progress on Integrated Strategic 
Management of Rhinoceros’ 24 July 2017 available at: 
https://www.environment.gov.za/mediarelease/molewa_proresson_integratedstrategic_managementofrhinocero
s_rhinopoaching Accessed on 9 November 2017. 
19
 Ibid.  
20
 Department of Environmental Affairs ‘The Viability of Legalising trade in rhino horn in South Africa’ 2014 
Available at: 
https://www.environment.gov.za/sites/default/files/docs/rhinohorntrade_southafrica_legalisingreport.pdf 
Accessed on 9 November 2017 
21
 Ibid.  
22
 Ibid.  
23
 Ibid.  
24
 Ibid.  
25
 Ibid. 
26
 Ibid.  
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(including animals and plants that are subject to harvest quota and regulated by permits), 
derivatives or products thereof.”27 
Wildlife trafficking is a criminal offence and has established links to other illegal trafficking, 
fraud and corruption; however, it is not seen as a priority by governments due to the fact that 
it is largely an environmental issue and as such does not get addressed immediately.
28
 
Human trafficking and drugs are seen as more important than trafficking of wildlife, but just 
as we must strengthen our efforts to fight human trafficking and drugs, our efforts to fight 
illegal wildlife trafficking must also be strengthened.
29
 
Approximations of the value of global trafficking of wildlife vary and reliable estimations are 
difficult to obtain – mostly because the trade is illegal, but illicit trade in the fishing industry 
is likely “between US$ 4.2 billion and US$ 9.5 billion per year.”30 
 
1.3. The Current State of The Rhino and Poaching Statistics 
Exact figures of the current rhino population are unknown, however, estimates are that the 
total number of rhino in the world today are about 30 000; which include between 19 666 and 
21 085 White rhino, 5040 and 5458 Black rhino, about 3500 Greater one-horned rhino and 
between 61 and 63 Javan rhino.
31
  
The White rhinoceros (Ceratotherium) and the black rhinoceros (Diceros Bicornis) have been 
the main victims of wildlife poaching. Rhinos used to be plentiful all through Asia and Africa 
with an estimated population of 500 000 globally during the early twentieth century.
32
 This 
fell to about 70,000 in 1970 and further to just about 29 000 living today.
33
 Notwithstanding 
this sad state of affairs, population figures of rhinos globally have been increasing in the past 
few years.
34
  
                                                          
27
 N South & T Wyatt ‘Comparing illicit trades in wildlife and drugs: an exploratory study’ 31 (1) Deviant 
Behaviour 538.  
28
 Dalberg Global Development Advisors ‘Fighting Illicit Wildlife Trafficking: A Consultation with 
Governments’ (2012) WWF International, Switzerland.  
29
 Ibid.  
30
 J Haken ‘Transactional crime in the Developing World’ Global Financial Integrity (2011) Washington 44.  
31
 ‘Rhino Population Figures’ Save the Rhino International available at: 
http://www.savetherhino.org/rhino_info/rhino_population_figures Accessed on 11 November 2017.  
32
 Ibid.  
33
 Ibid.  
34
 Ibid.  
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There has been a 96% decline in the number of black rhino “from 65,000 individuals in 1970 
to just 2,300 in 1993” due to poaching.35 Tenacious conservation programmes all through 
Africa have yielded an increase in black rhino numbers to a current population of between 
5,040 and 5,458 rhinos.
36
  
The southern white rhino is a wonderful success story. In the early 1900s, there were as little 
as 50 remaining, but now there are between 19,666 and 21,085 and it has the highest 
population among the rhino species.
37
  Since 2008, there has been a rapid increase in 
poaching which threatens to destroy all the good work done for rhino conservation in Africa 
over the last 20 years
38
 bringing the remaining rhino closer and closer to extinction 
notwithstanding the fact that populations are gradually increasing.  
In a report providing an update on the “Integrated Strategic Management of Rhinoceros”, the 
Minister noted a decline in rhino poaching numbers in South Africa.
39
 According to this 
report, “a total of 1028 rhino were poached between January 2017 and December 2017 
compared to 1054 in the same period for 2016 which amounts to a decrease of 26 rhinos.”40 
TRAFFIC, a wildlife trade monitoring network
41
  reports the same rhino poaching figures.
42
  
African rhino numbers have dropped dramatically during the past 20 years because of 
poaching.
43
 CITES statistics for 2012 reveal that the buying and selling rate of rhino horns 
are about US$ 60 000 - 80 000 on the black market.
44
 Because of the high poaching numbers 
and the lucrative illegal benefits of the horn, black rhinoceros numbers have decreased 
drastically to the point that it has been classified as an endangered species.
45
  
Conservationists have been doing great work in increasing rhino population numbers, 
however, increased poaching is an on-going obstacle to rhino population growth in Africa.
46
 
                                                          
35
 Ibid.  
36
 ‘IUCN Reports Deepening Rhino Poaching Crisis in Africa’ 9 March 2016 available at: 
http://www.iucn.org.za/content/iucn-reports-deepening-rhino-poaching-crisis-africa Accessed on 11 November 
2017. 
37
 Save The Rhino International, note 31 above.  
38
 Ibid.  
39
 Department of Environmental Affairs, note 8 above.  
40
 Ibid.  
41
 TRAFFIC is the leading non-governmental organisation working globally on trade in wild animals and plants 
in the context of both biodiversity conservation and sustainable development.  
42
 ‘TRAFFIC’s engagement on African rhinoceros conservation and the global trade in rhinoceros horn 
TRAFFIC available at: http://www.traffic.org/rhinos/  Accessed on 18 November 2017.  
43
 Cheteni, note 17 above.  
44
 Dalberg, note 28 above.  
45
 Cheteni, note 17 above. 
46
 Ibid.  
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South Africa alone has more than 93% of the white rhino population in Africa, but 
conservation efforts could be destroyed because of illegal poaching activities in countries like 
South Africa and Zimbabwe.
47
 
 
1.4. A General Overview of CITES   
Wildlife poaching is a transnational issue, therefore a short summary of CITES will be given 
to provide an international legal context. It is important to highlight, however, that CITES 
only governs international trade and does not govern other issues such as hunting (in the case 
of wildlife) and domestic trade. CITES will also be discussed in more detail in chapter three.  
CITES is an international convention aimed at “ensuring that international trade in specimens 
of wild animals and plants does not threaten their survival.”48    
Trade in plants and wild animals is a transnational issue which therefore requires 
international co-operation to protect those vulnerable species from over-exploitation
49
 CITES 
was established to assist with such co-operation. Today, protection is provided to more than 
35, 000 species of fauna and flora, either as “live specimens, fur coats or dried herbs.”50 
States join and adhere to CITES voluntarily and upon joining become known as Parties. 
States have to implement the Convention in their national laws but it does not replace 
national laws.   In some countries a treaty does not become binding immediately after it has 
been signed, it is merely an indication that the country approves of it. A further process 
known as ratification or accession is the process where a country makes the treaty binding 
law for that country. This is usually accomplished after a consultation process with 
lawmakers. However, in some countries, a treaty is domesticated as soon as it is ratified by 
the country in question, meaning it does not need to be enacted into law by the legislature.  
In South Africa, section 231 of the Constitution
51
 gives power to the National Executive to 
negotiate and sign treaties. The National Council of Provinces and the National Assembly 
                                                          
47
 Ibid.   
48
 CITES, ‘What is CITES?’ available at: https://www.cites.org/eng/disc/what.php  Accessed on 9 January 2018. 
49
 Ibid.  
50
 Ibid.  
51
 Note 5 above.  
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must then approve it by resolution, after which the treaty becomes binding. It then becomes 
law when it is enacted into national legislation.
52
  
CITES provides a structure that each party must adhere to – each party must ensure that 
CITES is implemented into their own domestic legislation.  CITES has 183 members
53
  and 
works by:  
“Subjecting international trade in specimens of selected species to certain controls. 
All import, export, re-export and introduction from the sea of species covered by the 
Convention has to be authorised through a licensing system. Each party to the 
Convention must designate one or more Management Authority in charge of 
administering that licensing system and one or more Scientific Authorities to advise 
them on the effects of trade and the status of the species.”54    
 
CITES categorises species into three appendices, based on the protection required. Appendix 
I protects “species threatened with extinction…trade in specimens of these species is 
permitted only in exceptional circumstances.” 55   Appendix II protects “species which 
although not necessarily now threatened with extinction may become so unless trade in 
specimens of such species is subject to strict regulation in order to avoid utilization 
incompatible with their survival.”56 Appendix III contains “species which any party identifies 
as being subject to regulation within its jurisdiction for the purposes of preventing or 
restricting exploitation and as needing the co-operation of other parties in the control of 
trade.”57  
CITES was signed by South Africa on 15 July 1975 and ratified on 13 October 1975.
58
 
 
1.5.The Demand for Rhino Horn 
Rhino horns are consumed in various ways with every part of the rhino including faeces and 
urine being of some value to humans.
59
 The use of these rhino products dates back to 
                                                          
52
 Ibid Section 231 (4). 
53
 Note 48 above.  
54
 Ibid.  
55
 Ibid, article II (1). 
56
 Ibid, article II (2). 
57
 Ibid, article II (3). 
58
 ‘List of Contracting Parties’ CITES available at: https://www.cites.org/eng/disc/parties/chronolo.php 
Accessed on 9 January 2018.  
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traditional Asian medicinal practices and these practices are still being followed by many 
people even though the practice itself is losing significance.
60
 Martin indicates that demand 
still exists for various rhino products including its horn.
61
  
For the most part, people are still ignorant about rhino horn and its uses.
62
 Martin highlights 
that “rhino horn is not used as an aphrodisiac” which is what is usually believed, but he 
identifies two sources of demand.
63
 Firstly, for “medicinal purposes, since it is regarded as 
having potent fever-reducing qualities by many Chinese people,”64 and secondly, for “the 
making of ceremonial dagger handles in Yemen.”65  
It is a long-standing tradition of using rhino horn for medicinal purposes.
66
 At first Asian 
rhinos would have been the source of all horn, but as their numbers started dropping and they 
became rare, African rhinos were then utilised.
67
 The Asian horn, popularly described as a 
“fire horn” is seemingly of better quality compared to the African “water horn”, therefore is 
more expensive on the black market.
68
 Martin highlights the “many ornamental uses for rhino 
horn in the past, but this appears to be limited to Yemen at present.”69  
There is a huge demand for rhino horn amongst many Asian countries. Some previously large 
consumers of rhino horn (such as Japan in the 1970s
70
 and South Korea in the 1980s) have 
ratified CITES and the utilisation of rhino horn in these countries has subsequently 
diminished.
71
 For instance, Japan ratified CITES in 1980 and through various initiatives, such 
as government directing manufacturers of medicines containing rhino horn to find substitutes, 
the need for rhino horn has reduced.
72
 In contrast, although China has joined CITES, it 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
59
 EB Martin ‘Rhino Exploitation: The Trade in Rhino Products in India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Burma, Japan and 
South Korea’ (1983) Hong Kong: World Wildlife Fund. 
60
 EB Martin ‘The international Trade in Rhinoceros Products’ Gland: IUCN/WWF 1979. 
61
 Ibid.  
62
 Ibid.  
63
 Ibid.  
64
 Ibid.  
65
 Ibid.  
66
 M Sas-Rolfes The Economics of Rhino Conservation: An Economic Analysis of Policy Options for the 
Management of Wild Rhino Populations in Africa submitted in part fulfilment of the Masters Course in 
Environmental and Resource Economics, University College London, July 1993. 
67
 Ibid.  
68
 Ibid.  
69
 Martin, note 60 above. 
70
 K Ellis ‘Tackling the demand for rhino horn’ Save the Rhino International available at: 
https://www.savetherhino.org/rhino_info/thorny_issues/tackling_the_demand_for_rhino_horn  Accessed on 12 
September 2016. 
71
 Ibid.  
72
 Ibid.  
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continues to be a consumer of rhino horn and a source of illegal trade.
73
 Similarly, there is a 
great demand for rhino horn in Vietnam.
74
 In this country, rhino horn is seen as a status 
symbol of the wealthy upper class and, in its grounded powdered form, it is mixed with water 
and consumed as a recreational drink.
75
 Furthermore, rhino horn is also perceived in Vietnam 
to have medicinal properties and is believed to cure cancer and detox the body after excessive 
alcohol consumption or rich food.
76
  
The variety of ways that rhino horn can supposedly be used and the worrying poaching rate 
highlight the need for Vietnam to take action immediately.
77
 Previously, CITES played an 
instrumental role in demand reduction campaigns in user countries in Asia and got those 
countries to implement rhino horn trade bans.
78
 CITES should exercise its power and force 
the government of Vietnam to “show political will in tackling the illegal trade in rhino horn, 
through rigorous law enforcement activities, arrests and sentencing.” 79  Public awareness 
initiatives can play a big role in changing the way people see rhino horn products and 
increasing people’s understanding of the detrimental effects of consuming wildlife products 
illegally.
80
 
From the mid-2000s Africa’s rhinos were under serious threat due to the increased demand 
for rhino horn.
81
 There appears to be a link in Asia’s rhino horn trade which is the increase in 
the levels of disposable income and rapid economic growth.
82
 In many Asian countries rhino 
horn and ivory (obtained from elephant tusks), are seen as social, wealth and status 
symbols.
83
 This creates a demand and rhino horn and ivory have become part of this demand 
– the more rhinos that get poached the rarer the commodity becomes and the higher the price 
                                                          
73
 Ibid.  
74
 Ibid.  
75
 Ibid.   
76
 Ibid.  
77
 Ibid.  
78
 Ibid.  
79
 Ibid.  
80
 Ibid.  
81
 J Shaw ‘Poaching Crisis in South Africa’ Save the Rhino International available at: 
https://www.savetherhino.org/rhino_info/thorny_issues/poaching_crisis_in_south_africa  Accessed on 27 July 
2016. 
82
 Ellis, note 70 above.  
83
 K Ammann ‘How Rhino Horns end up in Asian Jewellery Shops’ The Star 2 August 2013. Available at: 
https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2013/08/02/how-rhino-horns-end-up-in-asian-jewellery-shops_c810653  
Accessed on 22 August 2016. 
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will go.
84
 This is essentially what this paper comes down to whether legalising horn rhino 
trade will increase or decrease the demand for rhino horn.  
 
 
1.6. Research Question 
South Africa’s rhino are decreasing at an alarming rate. The primary focus of this dissertation 
is the regulation of the domestic trade in rhino horn in South Africa. More specifically, I will 
address the following research questions: 
1.6.1. What are the pros and cons of allowing domestic trade in rhino horn? 
1.6.2. Are the draft regulations regulating the domestic trade in rhino horn adequately 
formulated? 
1.6.3. What challenges and implications does allowing the domestic trade in rhino horn pose 
for South Africa in lights of its international obligations in terms of CITES?    
 
1.7. Research Methodology  
The central question of this dissertation will be answered by analysing legislation, case law, 
textbooks and journal articles. This will be done primarily by way of desktop research. No 
empirical research will be conducted.  
 
1.8.Structure of the Dissertation   
This dissertation has been divided into five chapters. Chapter one is the introduction and 
provides background information on poaching and the decline in the number of rhino in 
South Africa and the rest of the world generally. Also provided in this chapter is an overview 
of CITES which sets the international framework of the conservation of endangered species 
and it is also the vehicle driving the international ban on trade in rhino horn. Chapter two 
deals with rhino conservation legislation and case law in South Africa. The important case of 
                                                          
84
 Ibid.  
11 
 
Kruger and Another v Minister of Water and Environmental Affairs
85
 is also discussed in this 
chapter as well as another case which demonstrates various principles.  Chapter three looks 
at the pros and cons of having regulated trade in rhino horn. The South American vicuña is 
used as a case study both for and against the legalisation of domestic trade. Swaziland is used 
as a case study against the legalisation of domestic trade. Against this backdrop, Chapter 
four will offer recommendations for the approach South Africa should take. Various 
recommendations are put forth and discussed, and Chapter Five provides a conclusion.  
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CHAPTER TWO: RHINO CONSERVATION IN SOUTH AFRICA  
 
This chapter will deal with the rhino conservation legal framework. It will cover national 
legislation dealing with rhino conservation as well as selected cases which demonstrate the 
application of that legislation. The draft TOPS regulations published for comment in 2015 
will be discussed in relation to permits for possession of rhino horn and the sale of black or 
white rhino but it is important to note that these regulations (TOPS) were effected prior to the 
new draft regulations of February 2017 regulating domestic trade in rhino horn. 
 
2.1. South African legislation applicable to rhino conservation  
South Africa’s governance structures are separated into three tiers – the executive, the 
legislature and the judiciary.
86
 Environmental laws, including laws on conservation, are made 
by national and provincial government concurrently.
87
 
Important laws in South Africa that address conservation threats against the rhino are the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa;
88
 the National Environmental Management Act 
(NEMA);
89
 National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act
90
 (NEMBA) read with the 
Threatened or Protected Species Regulations
91
 (TOPS regulations); the National 
Environmental Management: Protected Areas Act
92
 (NEMPA); Norms and Standards For the 
Marking of Rhinoceros and Rhinoceros Horn, and for the Hunting of Rhinoceros for Trophy 
Hunting Purposes;
93
 Biodiversity Management Plan for White Rhinoceros;
94
 Biodiversity 
Management Plan for the Black Rhinoceros;
95
 CITES Regulations;
96
 the Draft Notice 
Prohibiting the Carrying out of Certain Restricted Activities Involving Rhinoceros Horn
97
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and many provincial ordinances. International and regional instruments are also applicable to 
the protection of threatened species as laws do not exist or operate in isolation.
98
 
2.1.1. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa99 
Environmental laws and rights in South Africa stem from the Constitution.
100
 In addition, it 
has been highlighted that “a constitutionally entrenched environmental right can provide a 
‘safety net’ when existing laws or policies are inadequate to address given environmental 
problems, and can inhibit economic programmes that are detrimental to the environment, and, 
by providing procedural environmental rights, should promote greater public participation in 
the interpreting and enforcing of substantive environmental rights.”101  
The Constitution provides in the Bill of Rights that:
102
 
“Everyone has the right –  
(a) To an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being; and 
(b) To have the environment protected, for the benefit of present and future generations, 
through reasonable legislative and other measures that –  
(i)       Prevent pollution and ecological degradation  
(ii) Promote conservation 
(iii) Secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources 
while promoting justifiable economic and social development.” 
The above constitutional provision explicitly gives a right to the environment to be protected 
and for natural resources (including wildlife) to be sustainably used and developed. The 
Constitution also mandates the promotion of conservation which guides NEMBA, NEMA 
and other conservation legislation. The Constitution is therefore the source of all rhino 
protection laws in South Africa.                     
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2.1.2. National Environmental Management Act (NEMA)103 
The environmental rights enshrined in the Constitution are brought to life by NEMA which 
establishes the legal framework for environmental conservation in South Africa.
104
 Important 
principles are set out that apply to organs of state and individuals.
105
  
Also incorporated is the important principle of sustainable development, which applies 
economically, environmentally and socially,
106
 as well as other global principles of 
environmental management, such as the “precautionary principle”107 and the “polluter pays 
principle.” 108  These principles apply to organs of state and individuals. Sustainable 
development practices strive to meet the demand of the present without compromising future 
supply. For rhino conservation this means using rhinos now but in a way that will not 
compromise their survival. This is discussed in more detail in 3.2.2. (Sustainable use 
paradigm). Sustainable use and the precautionary principle work hand in hand. According to 
the precautionary principle, future harm to human health or the environment must be avoided 
as much as possible. For rhino conservation, this means using rhinos in a way that does not 
threaten their survival or cause irreversible damage.  
Environmental Management Inspectors are appointed in terms of NEMA to assist with the 
enforcement of environmental law and they are given wide powers to “conduct inspections 
and searches, to seize items and to issue compliance notices”109 amongst other things. In this 
regard, they have had much success. These Environmental Management Inspectors are also 
referred to as the Green Scorpions.
110
  
The Green Scorpions are a national group of more than 600 Environmental Management 
Inspectors (EMIs).
111
 They form a network which comprises enforcement officials from 
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many organs of state.
112
 This network shares “intelligence, experience and standardised 
training and procedures in order to enforce South Africa’s environmental laws.”113 They are 
empowered to “enter premises to do routine inspections to check for compliance, they can 
seize evidence, question witnesses, take samples, establish roadblocks, arrest people and 
issue compliance notices.”114 This is particularly important for rhino conservation.  
The Green Scorpions cannot prosecute matters; however, they work closely with other 
government agencies.
115
 One such agency is the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigations 
(DPCI) also known as the Hawks. The Hawks, together with other government agencies have 
done sterling work in the fight against rhino poaching. From January 2017 to June 2017, the 
Hawks made “arrests and seizures in 9 cases involving rhino horn traffickers, 13 suspects and 
approximately 140 kilograms of rhino horn.”116 
The work of the various agencies (DPCI, SARS and Green Scorpions) are starting to yield 
results and trafficking syndicates are being infiltrated and dismantled.
117
 Poaching and illegal 
trafficking continues to be combatted owing to the cooperation between the Green Scorpions 
and other agencies such as SARS Customs.
118
  
During 2017, there were considerably more horns detected and seized at ports including OR 
Tambo International airport where there were several detections and seizures made between 
January 2017 and June 2017.
119
 
 
2.1.3. National Environmental Management: Protected Areas Act (NEMPA)120 
NEMPA allows for “the declaration and management of protected areas.”121 The purpose of 
the Act is to “consolidate and rationalise all the laws dealing with protected areas in South 
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Africa.”122 The National Parks Act123 is one of the pieces of legislation that was replaced by 
NEMPA. The legislation of the previous Homeland States were also replaced by NEMPA.
124
  
The purpose of the Act includes: “to conserve biodiversity,125 to protect areas representative 
of all ecosystems, habitats and species naturally occurring in South Africa,
126
  and to protect 
South Africa’s threatened or rare species.”127 Biodiversity also sometimes manifests in areas 
outside of the official areas of protection so the Act allows for “the declaration of protected 
environments that may be situated outside formally protected areas but are nevertheless 
subject to special conservation measures.”128 
The most important section in this Act in relation to rhino horn poaching and conservation is 
section 17 (e) which establishes that “the purpose of declaring such areas as protected is in 
order to protect threatened and rare species.” This is done by means of environmental 
agreements as set out in section 41 (1) of the Act. Section 17 (e) is given effect to by sections 
45 (1)
129
 and section 46 (1)
130
 which state that “no person may enter a protected area or 
nature reserve without the written permission of the management authority of that nature 
reserve. Moreover, no person may fly over such a nature reserve at an altitude of less than 
2500 feet without the permission of the management authority,”131 the management authority 
being South African National Parks (SANParks).  
The aim of the above sections is to “limit access of the general public to these nature reserves 
or protected areas precisely for the purpose of protecting, amongst others, endangered 
species.”132 
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2.1.4. National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act (NEMBA)133  
The most relevant and most important piece of legislation which affects the protection of 
rhino is the National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act
134
 (NEMBA), read with 
the Threatened or Protected Species Regulations (TOPS), March 2015. The purpose of the 
Act – which is aligned to the Convention of Biological Diversity135 is set out in chapter 1 
which is “the conservation of biodiversity, the sustainable use of its components, and the fair 
and equitable sharing of the benefits of the use of genetic resources.”136 CITES, the Ramsar 
Convention and the Bonn Convention on Migratory Species of Wild Animals are also given 
effect to by the Act.
137
 The State is the guardian of biodiversity in South Africa and has to 
“manage, conserve and sustain the biodiversity of South Africa.”138 
The South African National Biodiversity Institute (SANBI) is established by chapter 2 and it 
is tasked with “monitoring and reporting on biodiversity matters.”139 Chapter 3 allows for 
“coordinated biodiversity planning, monitoring and research.”140 There is also a responsibility 
on the Minister responsible for environmental affairs to “prepare a national biodiversity 
framework to provide for coordinated biodiversity management by organs of state and non-
governmental bodies and to identify conservation priorities.”141 
Chapter 4 deals with species and ecosystems that are threatened and the chapter’s purpose is 
“to provide for the protection of ecosystems and species that are threatened or in need of 
protection as well as ensure the sustainable use of biodiversity.”142 
The Minister is authorised to “publish a list of Critically Endangered, Endangered, 
Vulnerable or Protected Species” in respect of various categories of species which are 
defined in the Act.
143
  
Lists of Critically Endangered, Endangered, Vulnerable and Protected Species were 
published in 2007
144
 together with the Threatened or Protected Species Regulations.
145
  The 
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carrying out of a “restricted activity” without a permit is prohibited for any listed, threatened 
or protected species.
146
 Such activity can only be carried out if the requisite permit has been 
obtained in terms of Chapter 7.   
The restricted activities include “hunting, capturing or killing a living specimen by any 
means, method or device whatsoever; injuring a living specimen with intent to hunt, catch, 
capture or kill; importing or exporting; having in possession; breeding; translocating; and 
selling or trading any specimen.”147   
The Minister may also “prohibit the carrying out of any activity that may impact negatively 
on the survival of a listed, threatened or protected species.”148 In the context of conservation, 
these activities would include poaching and other related activities since both black and white 
rhinos are included on the list.  
Offences and penalties are covered in chapter 9. A person convicted of an offence may be 
liable to imprisonment of five years, a fine or both.
149
  Regarding a listed, threatened or 
protected species, carrying out of a “restricted activity” without a permit is an offence.150 The 
amount of the fine is regulated by the Adjustment of Fines Act.
151
 This provision is not 
directly related to conservation efforts, but it sets out the penalties for contravening the 
provisions of the Act or any of the restricted activities. Penalties and sanctions are usually 
envisaged as deterrents but also guide the courts as to what an appropriate sanction should be.   
 
2.1.5. Threatened or Protected Species (TOPS) Regulations 
Overview 
Draft TOPS Amendment Regulations in terms of NEMBA were published for comment in 
the Government Gazette on 16 April 2013
152
 and republished on 31 March 2015.
153
 The 2015 
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draft regulations include substantial amendments to the TOPS regulations originally 
published in 2007. The 2015 regulations do not replace the 2007 regulations, however, they 
introduce new provisions and they also propose substantial changes to the existing 2007 
regulations. For purposes of this dissertation, reference is made to the 2015 draft regulations.  
The purpose of the regulations are: “to further regulate the permit system set out in Chapter 7 
of the Biodiversity Act insofar that such system applies to restricted activities involving 
specimens of listed, threatened or protected species;
154
 to regulate the manner in which 
specific restricted activities may be carried out
155
 and to prohibit the manner in which specific 
restricted activities may be carried out.”156  
The permitting system for listed, threatened or protected species is dealt with by Chapter Two 
of the regulations. These include the permit requirements authorising possession of 
rhinoceros horn and additional requirements involving rhinoceros and rhinoceros horn.
157
 
Chapter 8 regulates specific restricted activities that involve species that are listed or 
threatened. These are important as they include provisions relating to hunting of black 
rhinoceros or white rhinoceros
158
 and the sale of live black rhinoceros or white rhinoceros.
159
 
Permits for Possession of Rhino Horn 
Rhinoceros horn can be possessed if the requirements set out in section 31 are met. The 
section requires that “whenever an application for a permit relating to the possession of 
rhinoceros horns is submitted to the issuing authority, the following must be accompany the 
application: information on the circumference, inner length and outer length;
160
 the weight of 
each individual detached rhinoceros horn, where practically possible;
161
 and photographs of 
each individual detached rhinoceros horn.”162  In addition, “the issuing authority must be 
satisfied that the quality of the photographs is adequate for easy identification of such 
horns”163 and that any  “person in possession of any rhino horn that is 5cm or more in length, 
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irrespective of the weight of such horn, must apply to the relevant issuing authority to have 
the rhino horn marked.”164 
If the possession of the rhino horn is lawful, and the issuing authority is satisfied it “must 
mark such horn by means of a micro-chip,
165
 to the extent possible and indelible ink or punch 
die using the following formula: the country of origin two letter ISO (International 
Organisation for Standardisation) code and the last two digits of the particular year, followed 
by a forward slash;
166
 the serial number for the particular year, followed by a forward 
slash;
167
 and the weight of rhino horn in kilograms.”168 
In addition, the issuing authority “must record the weight, the circumference169 and capture 
all the information contemplated above, including the micro-chip number in the database.”170 
 
Hunting of Black Rhino or White Rhino 
Only one hunting permit can be issued by the issuing authority to an applicant (usually a 
hunter) within a 12 month period which allows the hunting of a white rhinoceros for trophy 
purposes.
171
 
In all matters regarding the issuing of permits for the hunting of black or white rhinoceros in 
terms of these regulations, such permit can only be issued if the Department has 
recommended that such a permit be issued.
172
 
Any person that has received a permit to hunt black or white rhinoceros may only hunt if the 
hunt is “supervised by an official from the provincial conservation authority or an 
environmental management inspector.”173  
Sale of live Black Rhino or White Rhino 
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The owner of a live black rhino or a live white rhino “may sell the live rhino only if (a) such 
owner is authorised by a permit issued in accordance with these regulations to sell such black 
rhino or white rhino;
174
 (b) the genotyping of such black rhino or white rhino has been done 
in accordance with regulations 32 (4) and (5) of these regulations; and (c) such owner is in 
possession of a DNA certificate for each individual rhino, issued by the person responsible 
for the genotyping of such specimen.” 175  In addition “the DNA certificate issued for a 
particular specimen of black rhino or white rhino must accompany such specimen when it is 
sold by the owner thereof.”176 
 
2.1.6. Draft regulations for the domestic trade in rhinoceros horn, or a part, product or 
derivative of rhinoceros horn (2017) and Draft regulations relating to domestic trade 
in rhinoceros horn (2018) 
These draft regulations were published on 8 February 2017
177
 and 21 September 2018
178
 The 
main purpose of the 2017 regulations is to “regulate the domestic selling or otherwise trading 
in, giving, donating, buying, receiving, accepting as a gift or donation, or in any way 
disposing or acquiring, rhinoceros horn within the borders of the Republic, and the export of 
rhinoceros horn for personal purposes, from the Republic.”179 The 2018 are much the same 
except “personal purposes” is replaced by “primarily non-commercial purposes”.  
These regulations appear to be quite comprehensive and cover all activities involving 
rhinoceros horn. They also cover the issuing of permits for the activities regarding rhinoceros 
horn. The regulations will be discussed in greater detail in section 3.3.1 below.  
 
2.1.7. Norms and standards for the marking of rhinoceros and rhinoceros horn, and for the 
hunting of rhinoceros for trophy hunting purposes 
On 21 September 2018, the Minister published a notice in the Government Gazette 
withdrawing the previous notice originally published on 10 April 2012, and issued norms and 
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standards for the marking of rhinoceros and rhinoceros horn and for the hunting of rhinoceros 
for trophy hunting purposes in terms of section 9 of NEMBA. The norms and standards relate 
to the marking of live rhinoceros and rhinoceros horn, the management of the hunting of 
rhinoceros and other related matters. These norms and standards specify, inter alia, when and 
how live rhinos should be marked – if  a rhino has not been marked by a microchip before, or 
if the microchip is no longer detectable, then such rhino must be marked by a relevant issuing 
authority or a veterinarian with one microchip behind the ear and one microchip in each of 
the horns. 
180
 The norms and standards apply to “species of rhinoceros that are listed as 
threatened or protected in terms of section 56 of the Biodiversity Act”181 and must be read 
alongside the TOPS regulations.   
2.1.8. Biodiversity management plan for white rhinoceros 
The biodiversity management plan for white rhinoceros was published by the Minister on 2 
December 2015 in terms of section 43 (1) (b) (i) read with section 43 (3) of the Biodiversity 
Act (NEMBA). The aim of this management plan is to ensure the long-term survival of the 
white rhino and to “provide for the responsible person, organisation or organ of state to 
monitor and report on the progress (with implementation) of the plan.”182 The five year plan 
sets out strategies and actions that will assist in the long-term preservation of the white rhino 
including key components of monitoring, sustainability and management.  
2.1.9. Biodiversity management plan for black rhinoceros 
The biodiversity management plan for black rhinoceros was published by the Minister on 25 
January 2013 in terms of section 43 (1) (b) read with section 43 (3) of the Biodiversity Act 
(NEMBA). The aim of the management plan is to “promote the development and long term 
maintenance of viable populations of the various sub-species of African rhinos in the 
wild.”183 Like the management plan for the white rhinoceros, the purpose is also to ensure 
long-term survival of the black rhino and to “provide for the responsible person, organisation 
or organ of state to monitor and report on the progress (with implementation) of the plan.”184 
The plan sets out strategies and actions that will assist in the long-term preservation of the 
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black rhino including key components of monitoring, sustainability, biological management 
and human resources.  
2.1.10. CITES regulations  
CITES regulations were published by the Minister on 5 March 2010 in terms of section 97 (1) 
(b) (iv) of NEMBA. The regulations set out, inter alia, the conditions for international trade, 
the process for registration and marking, exemptions and special procedures and offences and 
penalties. These regulations apply to all plant and animal species listed in schedules I, II and 
II which correlate to Appendix I, II and II of CITES.
185
 
2.1.11. Draft notice prohibiting the carrying out of certain restricted activities involving 
rhinoceros horn  
On 21 September 2018 a draft notice prohibiting the carrying out of certain restricted 
activities involving rhinoceros horn was published by the Minister. This notice was published 
in terms of section 57 (2) read with section 100 of NEMBA. This notice contains provisions 
which were not included in the draft notice prohibiting the carrying out of certain restricted 
activities involving rhinoceros horn originally published on 8 February 2017.
186
 
 
2.2.Case Law applicable to rhino conservation 
 
2.2.1. Kruger and Another v Minister of Water and Environmental Affairs 
This is a case that was instituted in 2012, heard in 2015 and judgment granted in 2016. It is a 
challenge by Johann Kruger and Johan Hume (“the applicants”) who are both rhino farmers 
in South Africa. Both applicants were challenging the moratorium on domestic trade in rhino 
horn put in place in 2009 by the Minister and in addition Johann Kruger was also challenging 
the amendment to the Threatened or Protected Species Regulations (“TOPS Regulations”). 
The amendment (r.69) omitted lions as one of the listed large predators and Kruger argued 
that a proper consultative process had not been followed by the Minister in terms of sections 
99 and 100 of NEMBA. The moratorium came into effect in 2009, after suspicions that Asian 
nationals bought rhino in South Africa through the legal internal permitting system and then 
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exported illegally.
187
 The moratorium was in line with CITES’ objective of banning 
international trade. This obviously meant that rhino farmers like Kruger and Hume were no 
longer allowed to trade domestically in rhino horn. This violated a number of their rights 
which will be discussed below.  
In their challenge, the applicants jointly raised two issues and a third issue was raised by 
Kruger individually. Firstly, the applicants contended that personal notice should have been 
given to them before the moratorium was put in place. Hume based this argument on the 
premise that he is the largest rhino breeder in the world and therefore the Minister was 
obliged to give him personal notice of the moratorium and that failure to do so renders the 
moratorium reviewable and subject to be set aside. For this submission he relied on section 3 
of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 which deals with procedurally fair 
administrative action which materially and adversely affects the rights or legitimate 
expectations of any person.  
The applicants also argued that there had not been sufficient consultation before the 
moratorium was put in place. Section 99 of NEMBA require the Minister to allow public 
participation in the process of exercising a power in terms of this section and section 100 
requires the Minister to give notice in at least one national newspaper of the proposed 
exercise of power. The Applicants argued that this had not been done.  
Finally, Kruger argued further that the amendment to the TOPS regulations (r.69 wherein 
lions were not listed as one of the large predators) was a substantial amendment and contrary 
to section 99 and section 100 of the Act which required a consultative process to be followed 
for any amendment to the regulations.  
It was found by the High Court found that public participation requirements of NEMBA 
(publication in the Government Gazette and in at least one national newspaper) were not fully 
complied with by the then Minister and as a result the moratorium was set aside with 
immediate effect.
188
  On the challenge of personal notice raised by the applicants, the Court 
found that “the Minister was not under any obligation to give personal notice to Hume or 
Kruger as envisaged in section 3 (1) and (2) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 
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(PAJA)
189
 as she (the Minister) is empowered in terms of section 100 of NEMBA to follow a 
different procedure, which although different from the one contemplated in subsection (2) 
and (3) of PAJA, is nevertheless a fair procedure.”190  
On the challenge of sufficient consultation, the Court said that “this must be seen in light of 
the diversity of the South African population and the historical background and many 
languages, to allow proper public participation and to submit meaningful representations or 
objections, especially in the present case, where the moratorium has substantial consequences, 
one would have expected the Minister to be more proactive and go beyond the minimum 
requirement.”191 The Court found that there was insufficient public participation and non-
compliance with the most basic requirement of the proposed moratorium being advertised in 
“at least one national newspaper.”192 
On the final challenge of the amendment to the TOPS regulations (r.69), the Court noted that 
this argument had only been raised during oral argument for the first time on behalf of Kruger 
and as such disadvantaged the Minister because she could not deal with the allegations.
193
  
The Court also noted that Kruger’s business did not concern lions – his main business is 
farming and livestock.
194
 The Court didn’t make an outright decision on this, except to say 
that they “would have found that Kruger failed to establish locus standi to raise the attack 
against r.69 insofar as it relates to its omission of ‘lion’ as a listed predator species.”195 
Following the judgment of the High Court, the Minister then applied for leave to appeal. 
However, this application was dismissed with costs.
196
 A subsequent application for leave to 
appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) was also unsuccessful as was a further 
application that was made to the Constitutional Court.
197
 The Constitutional Court dismissed 
the application ostensibly on the basis that there were “no prospects of success” but no 
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further reasons were furnished.
198
 As a result, it is now lawful to trade rhino horns in South 
Africa.
199
 (The ban was lifted in 2016 but the draft regulations only came out in 2017).  
The significance of this judgment is that firstly it lifts the ban on domestic trade in rhino horn 
meaning that rhino horn can now be bought and sold lawfully in South Africa (obviously 
subject to strict regulations). Secondly, it highlights the need for a proper consultation 
process to be followed for the amendment of any legislation and finally and most importantly, 
even though the Court ruled against the Minister, the Court accepted the Minister’s 
arguments in favour of keeping a moratorium in place and highlighted the need for a 
moratorium which was “to prevent the extinction of the rhinos and to ensure the conservation 
of natural resources and species by protecting the survival of rhinos from poaching and 
smuggling of horns into the international market.”200 What is noteworthy is that the only 
reason the moratorium was lifted was because of significant non-compliance with the 
provisions of section 99 and section 100. If there was sufficient compliance the Court would 
have found that the moratorium was not irrational.
201
  
The following case demonstrates the application and development of law in matters dealing 
with rhino poaching. It also highlights the strict approach the courts are willing to take in the 
fight against poaching.  
 
2.2.2. Els v The State202 
This matter involved an appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal against sentencing only. It 
was first heard on 2 March 2012 and sentence was handed down on 13 March 2012. The                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
matter was taken on appeal by Mr. Jan Karel Els (Els) who is a game manager. He was 
charged in the Regional Court of Musina (Limpopo) with seven counts of contravening the 
Limpopo Environmental Management Act (LEMA).
203
 The first four counts related to 
contravention of section 31 (1) (a) of the LEMA which prohibits hunting of specially 
protected animals. Counts 5 to 7 contravened section 41 (1) (a) of LEMA which relates to the 
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“unlawful purchasing, possessing and conveying of the horns of a specially protected wild 
animal without a valid permit.” 
Els entered into a plea bargain with the State and pleaded guilty to counts 5, 6 and 7 and in 
return counts 1 to 4 were withdrawn by the State.
204
 For charges 5 and 6 the trial court 
sentenced him to ten years’ imprisonment with two years which would be suspended and in 
regarding charge 7 he was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment which was also suspended 
provided he does not commit the same offence within a five year period.
205
 A fine of R100 
000 per month for ten months was also imposed and that is to be paid to the National Wildlife 
Crime Reaction Unit to assist with investigation and research into rhino related matters.
206
 
Els was dissatisfied with the sentence imposed and appealed to the Gauteng division of the 
High Court in Pretoria.
207
 On 5 August 2014, the High Court set aside the fine of R100 000 
but left the eight years’ imprisonment and the four years’ suspended sentence unaltered.208 
On appeal, the SCA reduced the eight years’ imprisonment to four years’ imprisonment and 
did not alter the suspended four years sentence.
209
 The appeal court emphasised that the 
contraventions in the present case must be distinguished from the criminal activities of 
poachers.
210
 The court found that both Regional and High Courts had misdirected themselves 
by linking the conduct of the appellant to the poaching crisis.
211
 The court acknowledged that: 
“Threat to wildlife in South Africa has dramatically increased in recent years, and so 
has the illegal trade in rhino horns. As a result, this species is under a serious threat of 
being slaughtered or otherwise exploited, for economic gain. Sentences which reflect 
our censure will go a long way to safeguard the rhino from being economically 
exploited. Regrettably a non-custodial sentence would send out the wrong message.”212 
This case demonstrates the strict position that our courts are willing to take in the fight 
against poaching. However, the appeal court was also fair in that as much as they 
acknowledged the rhino-poaching crisis, they did not automatically equate the conduct of the 
appellant to the broader rhino-poaching crisis. They decided this matter on its own merits and 
imposed a sentence that was suited to the crime, the criminal and fairness to society.
213
 The 
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appellant was found in possession of rhino horn but was never charged for killing any rhino. 
The Magistrate had sentenced the appellant as if he were a poacher. Since this matter did not 
involve trade in rhino horn, it was dealt with by provincial legislation (Limpopo 
Environmental Management Act 7 of 2003) even though provisions of the TOPS regulations 
were also contravened.  
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CHAPTER THREE: DOMESTIC TRADE IN RHINO HORN 
 
3.1. History and Background 
This chapter will set out the pros and cons of having a regulated domestic trade in rhino horn. 
A brief history of international and domestic rhino trade will be set out and the events leading 
up to the current legislative developments will also be set out.  
In the past, numerous attempts have been made by conservation organisations to curb 
poaching and increase measures to curb poaching, however, the first real attempt was to 
include rhinos and their products on the “Appendix I” list of CITES between 1975 and 
1977.
214
 As previously discussed, Appendix I includes “species threatened with extinction 
which are or may be affected by trade. Trade in specimens of these species must be subject to 
particularly strict regulation in order not to endanger further their survival and must only be 
authorised in exceptional circumstances.”215 Unfortunately, prevention of poaching and over 
exploitation (the primary objectives of CITES) have not been met by the trade ban.  
Attempts at curbing poaching have also been made by various African countries including 
Kenya, Zimbabwe and South Africa; however, many African countries cannot sustain or fund 
anti-poaching mechanisms and systems which include law enforcement and policing.
216
 
Many of these countries have had to rely on, and implement, alternative methods and 
techniques, which include: heavier sanctions; moving rhinos to safer areas; dehorning; trade 
bans by non CITES signatories and trade restrictions (such as South Africa where a 
moratorium on domestic trade was implemented in 2009).
217
  
The media and conservation campaigns have largely supported the above actions.
218
 The 
belief that trade in rhino horn is “wrong” and must be stopped has been the driving force of 
previous anti-poaching techniques.
219
  
After various failed attempts at preventing or curbing rhino poaching, South Africa imposed a 
moratorium on domestic trade in 2009.
220
 Prior to 2009 domestic and international trade 
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(arising from authorised hunting of rhino horn) were permitted in South Africa.
221
 The 
moratorium continued until 2016 when the court set it aside in the Kruger case discussed in 
an earlier chapter. Three months after the Kruger judgment the Minister released draft 
regulations for the domestic trade in rhino horn. The result is that we have domestic trade 
made legal again only this time there is supposedly stricter trade measures put in place. The 
arguments for and against domestic trade will now be discussed. 
 
3.2. Arguments for legalisation  
3.2.1. Legal trade lessens the demand on the illegal “black” market 
The main argument in favour of legalising domestic trade is that legal trade will lessen the 
demand on the black market. Put differently: if a product can be sourced legally, there is less 
motivation to try to obtain that product illegally since the illegal avenue comes with greater 
risks.
222
  
It is often argued by environmentalists that legal trade will in fact provide a cover for the 
trade of illegal products since illegal products could be laundered through the legal permitting 
system, but there is no evidence to support this.
223
 There is, however, some evidence to 
suggest that a legal trade in rhino horn can curb poaching and assist in rhino conservation.
224
 
During the period of the moratorium (2009 to 2016) poaching increased rapidly with the most 
number of rhinos poached in 2014. However, since 2015, poaching numbers have 
decreased.
225
 
The question of whether legal trade will lessen the demand on the illegal market has not been 
conclusively established; however, we can look to other examples where regulated trade 
actually increased diminishing population numbers. 
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Case Study: Crocodiles 
The population numbers for crocodiles started declining from the 1950s due to high demand 
for, inter alia, skin and meat.
226
 These included Nile crocodiles in Africa and Saltwater 
crocodiles in South Asia, South-east Asia, Australia and the Pacific islands.
227
 The idea of 
‘crocodile farming’ was then implemented by countries including Zimbabwe, Australia and 
Indonesia and this resulted in increasing population numbers and also generated money 
which was then reinvested into crocodile conservation.
228
 The Crocodile Specialist Group 
found that “despite predictions that legal trade would encourage illegal trade, an outstanding 
result of market-driven conservation of crocodilians is that illegal trade has all but been 
eradicated in the face of well-regulated legal trade.”229   
The same strategy that worked for crocodiles in the above case study can also be applied to 
rhinos. A well-managed and well-regulated system would allow rhino populations to thrive 
and reduce the need to acquire the horn illegally.  
A well-regulated system that attempts to de-value rhino horn is one of the ways that legal 
trade could work. This is one of two approaches submitted by Michael t’Sas-Rolfes, an 
environmental economist.
230
 The first approach which is in line with de-valuing the horn, is 
the conventional approach and according to this approach “the demand for more stocks of 
rhino horn must be reduced to a point where it is no longer worthwhile to continue illegal 
exploitation and trade.” 231  Put differently: the value associated with rhino horn should 
decrease to a state where it is not needed anymore.
232
 The most obvious way of decreasing 
the value of the rhino horn is to legalise trade which would in turn decrease the value of the 
horn since it would now be in abundant supply and would not need to be obtained on the 
black market which often attracts an exorbitantly higher price. It is submitted that other 
alternatives could be community programmes which educate and raise awareness about not 
buying rhino horn.   
The second approach is the alternative approach which perceives “overexploitation of 
biological resources as the result of underinvestment and highlights that any solutions to the 
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rhino problem must address the underlying economic forces driving this process.”233 This 
approach seeks to do the opposite of the conventional approach – it seeks to increase the 
monetary worth of living rhinos. Through this approach it is believed that exploitation of 
rhino can be prevented through sustainable, regulated trade.
234
  
In summary, there are two main points that can be deduced from the above discussion in 
support of legal trade. The first is that there is some evidence that suggests that poaching 
numbers increased during the moratorium and this promotes the argument that legal trade 
would reduce poaching of rhino. If a product can be sourced legally then there would be no 
desire to obtain the product illegally which often attracts greater risk. The second point flows 
from the first which is that by allowing the horn to be sold legally, the value of the horn 
decreases because it is more readily available. In theory this would mean the greater the 
supply the cheaper the horn would be. A well-regulated legal system could allow rhino 
numbers to grow provided that strict monitoring structures are in place as in the case of 
crocodiles.  
 
3.2.2. Sustainable Use Paradigm 
The sustainable use paradigm denotes that if wildlife is able to be used in any way, then 
benefits can be derived from it which will ultimately sustain and save it.
235
 Sustainable use of 
biological resources is important and is enunciated as an objective in NEMBA which 
promotes “the use of biological resources in a sustainable manner"236  and “the fair and 
equitable sharing of benefits among stakeholders of benefits arising from bioprospecting 
involving indigenous resources.”237 Although bioprospecting in itself is not directly related to 
conservation, it shares the same underlying values in that it provides for the sharing of 
benefits in the areas where such bioprospecting takes place.
238
 This benefit-sharing principle 
provides an incentive to local communities to conserve wildlife. It is the South African 
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National Biodiversity Institute that is tasked with co-ordinating programmes in the 
conservation and sustainable use of indigenous biological resources.
239
 
At an international level, sustainable use is promoted by Article 10 of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity
240
 which mandates contracting parties to “integrate consideration of the 
conservation and sustainable use of biological resources into national decision-making”;241 to 
“adopt measures relating to the use of biological resources to avoid or minimize adverse 
impacts on biological diversity”;242 to “protect and encourage customary use of biological 
resources in accordance with the traditional cultural practices that are compatible with 
conservation or sustainable use requirements”;243 to “support local populations to develop 
and implement remedial action in degraded areas where biological diversity has been 
reduced”; 244  and to “encourage cooperation between its governmental authorities and its 
private sector in developing methods for sustainable use of biological resources.”245 
The sustainable use paradigm is deeply rooted in the above Convention and many of the 
principles of the Convention have been incorporated into South African environmental law 
which promotes sustainable use of natural resources.  
This paradigm advocates for use of rhino in a sustainable way. This is because of the fact that 
rhinos can regrow their horns after they have been removed. This is one of the main reasons 
that rhino farms exist. Rhino farm owners like John Hume grow rhino for this sole purpose. 
The value of Hume’s stockpile as at 2016 was about $235 million246 which he was later 
allowed to auction in 2017.  
Despite the fact that the horn takes about 12 months to regrow, the rhino farmers also believe 
that this is one of the best methods of conserving rhino because during the slow period of 
regrowth rhinos have no value to poachers.
247
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De-horning is a practice that takes place at John Hume’s farm. Hume – discussed in chapter 2 
– is the largest private breeder of rhino in the world.248 According to Hume, rhinos can 
regrow their horns about a dozen times during their lifetime.
249
 It is submitted that this is a 
good strategy to make rhinos less attractive to poachers, but this should also be coupled with 
the usual security and monitoring  
In addition to de-horning which promotes the sustainable use of rhino, this paradigm also 
highlights a close link that exists between farming and conservation of wild animals.
250
 It is 
submitted that poaching can be reduced or even eradicated completely when local 
communities get involved through sustainable farming of the wild animals which in turn also 
provides them with direct benefits.  
Direct benefits include income from sale of livestock, meat, animal products; education, 
research and ecotourism. The sustainable use paradigm has been successful in various 
countries with different species. The first example is the vicuña which is one of two South 
American camelids which lives in the high alpine areas of the Andes.
251
  
 
Case Study: The South American Vicuña 
During the 1960s vicuñas nearly went extinct from over hunting and CITES placed a 30 year 
ban on trade.
252
 In the 1990s the idea of sustainable use of vicuña wool was introduced by the 
Vicuña Convention
253
 – this was a unique treaty between the countries which contain vicuña. 
According to the Convention, local communities would benefit from the sale of vicuña fibre 
– the animals would be sheared alive and then returned to their natural habitat.254 Only after 
successful results were achieved (i.e. vicuñas increased in numbers) would trade in vicuña 
wool re-open.
255
 
It is submitted that the successful increase in population numbers could only be achieved 
once local communities started receiving a benefit from the sale of vicuña. The local 
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communities were more willing to cooperate with local authorities and private farm owners 
since their livelihood depended on the survival of the species. Through the cooperation and 
support of local communities, vicuña numbers increased and the species is now thriving and 
is being used sustainably. 
256
 
 
Case Study: Bubye River Conservancy in Zimbabwe 
Another good example of the sustainable use principle is the Bubye River Conservancy in 
Zimbabwe.   
During the 1900s the Bubye River Conservancy was an infamous cattle farm.
257
 Through this, 
the idea of wildlife farming was born.
258
 This idea received further momentum by ecologists 
who suggested that wildlife would generate greater financial rewards compared to cattle, 
especially in those areas that were experiencing drought since cattle were heavily reliant on 
fertile grazing pastures.
259
 Plans were put into place by the local cattle farmers to create an 
environment where wildlife could thrive. Through this, the natural habitat was restored and 
indigenous animals were re-introduced.
260
 
Today, large numbers of wild animals live with a sense of balance on the conservancy.
261
 
There are currently 34 species of wild animals living freely in the Bubye Valley Conservancy 
including the Big Five.
262
  
Wildlife is now thriving at this conservancy and local farm owners, local communities and 
the environment are benefiting from the conservation and research activities which have 
replaced the dusty run-down cattle farm that existed previously.
263
   
These case studies demonstrate that with the support of local communities and/or private 
owners, wild animals can be managed sustainably since the local communities – including 
land owners – have a direct interest in the preservation of those wild animals. A direct 
interest can take various forms such as individuals working on the animal farms; providing 
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community education about wildlife heritage and conservation, individuals benefiting from 
game meat and so forth. 
Although the Bubye River Conservancy is an example regarding the sustainable use of land 
and not animals, it is still relevant because of the principle that it demonstrates – when 
communities have a direct interest in conservation, wildlife can be managed sustainably. In 
this example, it was the land that was managed sustainably, through the assistance of local 
communities, and it was revived to the point where it is now a thriving natural habitat. As 
discussed above, rhinos can regrow their horns and it is for this reason that the sustainable 
use of rhinos that is being advocated through de-horning.  
There are, however, two main arguments opposing this paradigm of sustainable use of wild 
animals. The first is that the world has changed far too much and indigenous communities 
have become globalised. Katarzyna Nowak, a wildlife journalist, argues the world has 
changed too much – she believes that infrastructure has improved, linking more cities and 
towns to each other, and technology – including the internet, is now more readily available 
and because of these advances, individuals are able to easily purchase something that is 
banned in one jurisdiction but not in another.
264
 She is of the view that local communities 
using animals sustainably is a romantic idea which is not feasible in the 21
st
 century.
265
 In 
response to this I’d like to submit that Ms. Nowak’s view is in fact a romantic idea since her 
views clearly demonstrate a westernised notion of the 21
st
 century especially in the context of 
Africa as a continent. Her views do not take into account the millions of people living in rural 
communities all around Africa without access to basic services – let alone internet access. 
Her ideas do not take into account that many people living in Africa rely on the continent’s 
natural resources for their day to day living such as the Makuleke people from the region of 
Makuleke in the Kruger National Park who together with the private sector, have opened a 
six-star 36 bed lodge called the Outpost in a beautiful site in the park.
266
 Jobs at the lodge are 
for the locals and a skills transfer programme is also in place.  
In addition to the example of the Makuleke people discussed above, there are many other 
examples of communities that benefit from the sustainable use of wildlife and nature. 
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Another example is the Pilansberg National Park in the North West of South Africa which 
was one of the first examples of integrated community development with wildlife 
conservation. With the establishment of the national park, local communities were displaced 
from their residence and lost grazing land and access to wild resources. A wide variety of 
benefit sharing initiatives were established to compensate these local communities for their 
loss. One of the initiatives was the establishment of the Community Development 
Organisation by the park authorities.
267
 
The second argument opposing this paradigm is that it is only the game farmers, and corrupt 
politicians that will benefit from legal trade and therefore it is not a viable reason to advocate 
for legalising of rhino horn trade.
268
 In the Kruger case,
269
 for example, Johan Hume (second 
applicant) argued for the lifting of the moratorium because he is the largest breeder of rhino. 
In 2009, when the moratorium came into effect, he lawfully owned approximately 4000 
kilograms of horn that he had obtained legally from rhino populations of his own.
270
 The 
court did not discuss this issue in great detail except to say that: 
“The moratorium on domestic trade in rhino horns should be having a significant adverse 
impact on the employees and families of the rhino breeders like Hume and Kruger. The 
communities and business owners in the surrounding areas where rhino breeding 
operations are conducted could have been engaged due to possible loss of employment 
benefits occasioned by the moratorium.”271 
 
The quote above demonstrates that the court does in fact acknowledge the role that game 
farming plays in local communities to individuals and business owners alike. As mentioned 
above, to say that trade in rhino horn would only exclusively benefit local communities and 
farmers is irrational and does not take into the number of communities and local businesses 
currently benefiting from the use of wild animals and game farms.  
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There are many communities across the country that are benefiting from natural resources. In 
addition to communities benefiting, the economy also benefits tremendously from tourism, 
hunting and other wildlife-related activities.  
In summary, the cases of the South American vicuña and the Bubye River Conservancy 
demonstrate that greater results can be achieved in the fight against poaching when local 
communities have a vested interest in the conservation of wildlife, for example, if they 
benefit from supplies of meat or if they are provided employment opportunities by the game 
reserve or farm.
272
 There is a greater need or desire to conserve wildlife if there is something 
to be gained by such conservation. This supports the argument of legalisation of domestic 
rhino trade, but in a sustainable manner.  
 
3.2.3. Prohibition has failed 
The international ban on trade in rhino horn started in 1977 with CITES coming into effect. 
In 2009 a moratorium was placed on domestic trade in South Africa effectively prohibiting 
the sale of rhino horn domestically.   
Prohibition is not very effective when it comes to the prevention or management of trade in 
“undesirable products.”273 All it does is increase the demand on the black market and raises 
the price of acquiring the product illegally. The demand for an illegal or “undesirable” 
product will never go away. If something is banned or prohibited its value increases because 
of the high risk involved in acquiring it and this in turn increases black market trade which 
becomes the only source of the product.
274
  
 
3.3. Theories against legalisation  
3.3.1. Increase in demand for rhino horn  
One of the main arguments for legalising trade is that by ‘flooding’ the market with legal 
supplies of rhino horn (either through stockpiles or legal dehorning) the black market prices 
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will decrease and the incentive to buy illegally will decline.
275
 Those that oppose legal trade 
believe that this, however, is not a rational argument and it has several flaws.
276
 Currently 
there are stockpiles that can be supplied in small batches and they will have an effect in 
decreasing market value, however, once those stockpiles have been depleted, the demand for 
rhino horn will remain but there will be an inadequate supply to meet that demand.
277
 
Moreover, will there be enough rhino to meet future demand and to keep prices low? Will 
there be enough rhino to meet future demand to deter poaching? If the prices rise or the 
supply runs out, the risk of poaching will return and we will find ourselves in the same 
position we were in.  
On 17
th
 August 2017, the late Minister addressed this issue in a media statement published on 
the Department’s website.278 The Minister, in the media statement, attempts to debunk claims 
that poaching has increased since the lifting of the moratorium. She highlights that “there is 
no evidence that has been presented to date that indicates the existence of a causal link 
between the moratorium and rhino poaching.”279 The moratorium was put in place in 2009 
and since then a number of steps have been taken by the Department to regulate stockpiles in 
the country. Among the steps taken are: 
a. “The implementation of the Norms and Standards for the Marking of Rhinoceros and 
Rhinoceros Horn and the Hunting of Rhinoceros for Trophy Hunting purposes in 
2012, which replaced the norms and standards of 2009; 
b. A national database has been established; and 
c. A genetic profiling system for live rhino and rhino horn.”280 
The Minister maintains that legal trade does not mean that poaching will increase – “the 
increase in confiscation of rhino horn at points of entry and exit and the arrest of the alleged 
smugglers, is not an indication of an increase in illegal activities, but rather a demonstration 
of the country’s improved detection capabilities, as well as improved reporting, including 
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reporting by other countries.”281 Again, the Minister emphasises that “there is no scientific 
evidence that the domestic sale of rhino horn will have a negative impact on the survival of 
the species.”282 
The Minister went on further to highlight that “South African authorities have improved their 
ability to track the movement of rhino horn through the implementation of a national database 
and systems relating to the marking of rhino and genetic profiling.” 283  In addition, the 
Department has “further improved their detection ability at ports of entry and exit by 
increasing awareness, human capacity, technology and skills.”284 This is indeed evident by 
the criminals that have been brought to justice through arrests, confiscations and 
convictions.
285
  
According to another media statement by the Minister reporting on the “Progress on 
Integrated Strategic Management of Rhinoceros”, during January 2017 to June 2017, there 
have been a total number of 359 traffickers and alleged poachers arrested throughout South 
Africa including arrests at O.R Tambo airport
286
 and 112 individuals were arrested outside 
Kruger National Park and 90 arrested inside the Park.
287
 It is not clear whether the arrests at 
O.R Tambo and elsewhere are going to make the public feel better about domestic trade 
being legal, but the Minister and her team seem confident that the measures they have in 
place are going to deliver successes. In the bigger scheme of things, however, the arrests 
demonstrate that systems in place are working but those systems are mainly reactive in design 
i.e. apprehending criminals after the rhinos have already been killed and dehorned. Poachers 
operate in syndicates – apprehending one offender is hardly going to make a difference as 
there will always be someone else to take his/her place.  
The Minister assured the members of the public that “the Department is working closely with 
the South African Police Services (SAPS), South African Revenue Services (SARS), Defence, 
Military Veterans, State Security Agency, the Department of Justice and Constitutional 
Development, National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), Correctional Services, alongside the 
SANParks and provincial conservation authorities and other stakeholders to implement the 
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Integrated Strategic Management of Rhinoceros Approach, which is focused on the 
protection of the rhino.”288 
In summary, it is apparent that the Department is aware of the risk that legal trade could 
cause an increase in rhino horn, however, the Minister and her team are confident that that 
will not be the case because of the successful interventions by SAPS and other law 
enforcement agencies. The Minister further highlights that there is no scientific evidence that 
domestic trade will threaten rhinos. It is, however, a valid concern that once stockpiles are 
depleted, living rhinos will be targeted in order to meet the demand but the Minister has not 
fully addressed that issue save to say that the presence of law enforcement authorities has 
increased and that more arrests have been made.  
 
3.3.2. Legal trade provides a cover for illegal exports (laundering) 
One of the primary claims is that South Africa is not equipped to control or regulate future 
domestic trade in rhino horn and can barely deal with current levels of poaching.
289
 The 
country cannot ensure that domestic trade is regulated and that it does not contribute to an 
increase in the international trade which is illegal. Put differently: legal domestic trade in 
rhino horn, which the 2017 regulations permit, may provide a cover for illegal exports which 
South Africa may not be able to control, as the DEA itself concluded in 2014.
290
  
In the case of trophy hunting there is no way that South Africa could monitor or track what 
happened to the horns once they arrived in the destination country since South Africa’s 
hunting laws only apply within the Republic.
291
 This will also be the case with horns 
domestically traded and allowed to leave the country.  
The Minister’s response to this is that “there are legislative provisions in place to ensure the 
domestic trade in rhino horn is strictly controlled and that the prohibition of the commercial 
international trade ban by CITES is not violated.”292 She also goes on further to highlight that 
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additional measures are being taken to tighten legislation with regard to the domestic trade in 
rhino horn.”293 
The loopholes in the current regulations, which will be discussed later, highlight some of the 
challenges that are likely to be faced in the future. It is not clear whether our current statutory 
framework adequately addresses the glaring risk that legal trade will provide a cover for 
illegal exports. The only way to really overcome this challenge is to have an effective 
monitoring system in place once the horns leave South Africa.  
3.3.3. Tainted reputation among CITES member states (Swaziland case study) 
CITES is aware that there is an urgent need to reduce the demand for rhino horn products.
294
 
Intensive efforts have been made by governments and NGOs to educate consumers, and to 
persuade them not to buy or use rhino horn in key consumer countries including Vietnam and 
China.
295
 These efforts have been greatly enhanced by the fact that commercial international 
trade in rhino horn is illegal.
296
 However, if rhino horn is legally sold within South Africa and 
imported into destination countries there is a great chance that the horn could be sold illegally 
on the black market. If this happens, it is submitted that South Africa will be placed in a 
vulnerable position and will be looked down upon by other member states. South Africa will 
be seen as the source of that illegal horn and will be perceived as undermining CITES and 
reversing the efforts that have been made to curb poaching. Swaziland was in a similar 
position in 2016 at CoP17 when they proposed the sale of their rhino horn to international 
partners in an effort to raise money. CITES Parties made their views on international rhino 
horn trade extremely clear during a discussion of Swaziland’s proposal.297  
Case Study: Swaziland 
Swaziland’s proposal was made in order to generate income ($1.2 million per annum) to 
finance the management of its parks where 73 rhino live.
298
 Without that income their rhinos 
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will be at greater risk to poachers. Their proposal was to sell 330kg of white rhino horn from 
stocks and 20kg annually from natural deaths and the harvesting of horn on a rotational basis 
from about 4 rhino (12kgs).
299
 Their proposal was aimed at mitigating the risk and not 
increasing the risk. This proposal was rejected by the Parties in a secret ballot with 26 Parties 
in favour, 100 against and 17 abstentions.
300
  
Eustace, an economist and member of the IWMC delegation at Cop17, argues that CITES 
was irrational and unreasonable for rejecting Swaziland’s proposal.301 According to Eustace 
who was present at CoP17, the Secretariat saw harm to the species should the proposal be 
adopted but they did not clarify the risks and may not have understood where the real risks 
actually lie.
302
  
Swaziland appeared strong-willed in their proposal and openly vented cynicism against non-
governmental organisations, activists and even CITES Parties.
303
 They argued that despite the 
ban being in place for 39 years, poaching still continues and a change is needed.
304
 They 
argued further that trade in rhino horn is only illegal because CITES has criminalised it and 
they (Swaziland) would much rather use rhinos sustainably to finance conservation efforts 
without actually killing any rhinos.
305
 Swaziland openly criticised CITES for being counter-
productive and contributing to the demise of the rhinos.
306
 They referred to the almost 40 year 
old ban as futile and insane.
307
 These are just are some of the criticisms brought against 
CITES by Swaziland which could have contributed to the rejection of their proposal.  
Michler, an NGO representative at CoP17 questioned Swaziland’s proposal stating that “it is 
entirely out of step with world opinion, a situation a nation such as Swaziland can’t afford to 
be in.” This warning to the small Swazi nation seems to be exactly what they were arguing in 
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their proposal – the fact that they do not share many of the same issues or conflicts as the rest 
of the world. It is for this reason that Vegter argues that African nations should withdraw 
from CITES to manage their own natural resources.
308
 
It is submitted that if Swaziland were to withdraw from CITES or if they were allowed to 
trade, they would not be able to trade freely with potential trade partners such as China and 
Vietnam for example. Those countries would remain CITES Parties and would be subject to 
extremely strict trade requirements and possible trade sanctions would be imposed against 
Swaziland. Swaziland is in a vulnerable position and has left itself open to attack by the 
international community for its politically charged statements. The country’s proposal was 
not accepted very well by the NGO community and CITES Parties and they were labelled by 
the media as acting as a ‘puppet’ of South Africa309 and that it (Swaziland) had accused South 
Africa of backtracking on rhino horn trade.
310
  
Taking into account this example of Swaziland, the real question comes down to our 
obligations to CITES and more importantly its effectiveness in prohibiting trade both 
internationally and domestically. It is clear that CITES takes a very serious view regarding 
the legalisation of international trade. Ideally CITES would have no trade in rhino horn but 
legalising domestic trade is out of the control of CITES, however, it still goes against the 
mission of CITES which is to ensure that trade in specimens of wildlife does not threaten 
their survival. In this case it would seem that by willingly selling rhino their survival is in fact 
threatened.  
This issue will be discussed further in 3.5 below and also in Chapter 4 which will look at 
recommendations for the way forward.  
3.3.4.. The draft regulations have too many flaws 
This section is a discussion of the draft regulations which were published in February 2017 
(hereinafter referred to as the 2017 regulations). Additional draft regulations were published 
on 21 September 2018
311
 (hereinafter referred to as the 2018 draft regulations) which include 
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regulations that were not included in the 2017 regulations. A short discussion of the 2018 
regulations will also follow.  
 According to the late Minister, comments on the 2017 regulations were received and 
considered and the provisions of the regulatory measures have been finalised.
312
 
Notwithstanding the Minister’s statement, it is not entirely clear what the status of the 2017 
regulations are since the final regulations have not been published. It is also not clear what 
the status of domestic trade is because the Minister announced that since the lifting of the ban 
in 2017, 28 permits have been issued – 12 permits for the sale of rhino horn, and 16 for the 
purchase of rhino horn.
313
 With this in mind it seems that the Minister has been issuing 
permits even before the 2017 regulations were finalised which is somewhat worrying. An 
even greater concern is that we now have an additional set of regulations which were 
published for comment together with the 2017 regulations which causes a lot of confusion. 
The current regulatory framework includes a combination of supposedly final regulations and 
draft regulations in one document labelled “draft regulations relating to domestic trade in 
rhinoceros horn.”314 
Note though, that only the additional 2018 regulations are available for comment and not the 
2017 ones. 
The 2017 regulations have supposedly been finalised (but not yet published) and will still be 
discussed insofar as they are problematic. The Minister did take public comment into account 
regarding the 2017 regulations and many of the loopholes have been tightened but further 
loopholes have been created by the 2018 regulations.  
Below are some of those flaws which have been highlighted as problematic either in terms of 
enforcement or from a technical point of view.  
Regulation 2 (1) of the 2017 regulations sets out the purpose of the regulations which was 
“to regulate the domestic selling or otherwise trading in, giving, donating, buying, receiving, 
accepting as a gift or donation, or in any way disposing or acquiring, rhinoceros horn within the 
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borders of the Republic, and the export of rhinoceros horn for personal purposes, from the 
Republic.”315 
The term ‘personal purposes’ was not defined in the 2017 regulations and would have had 
serious consequences for the regulation of trade in rhino horn. The effect would have been 
that any individual could leave the country with rhino horn under the guise of personal 
purposes. The finalised regulations omit ‘personal purposes’ and replace it with ‘primarily 
non-commercial purposes’ which means “for a purpose that is not directed towards the 
gaining of any economic benefit through sale, resale, exchange, provision or delivery of a 
service, or any other form of economic use or benefit.”316 This added definition does not do 
much to alleviate the problem of exporting rhino horn under the guise of primarily non-
commercial purposes which is essentially personal purposes.  
Regulation 3 (3) of the 2017 regulations established that foreign nationals, regardless of the 
reason for their visit to South Africa, may export a maximum of two rhinoceros horns only 
for personal purposes.  This, however, only pertained to persons from foreign states who visit 
South Africa and who have acquired rhino horn.
317
 The regulations were silent on whether 
South African citizens or permanent residents would be able to export horn and if so whether 
they would also be able to export them for personal purposes. There was no clear reason why 
foreign nationals and South African citizens are differentiated in these circumstances, save to 
say that foreign nationals are more likely to export rhino horn since they are not permanently 
resident in South Africa and they enter and exit the Republic more frequently.  
The finalised regulations have omitted the two horn requirement on the part of foreign 
nationals but they include an additional regulation which prohibits the sale, donation, or 
disposal of rhinoceros horn to any persons who are not citizens of the Republic;
318
 to any 
company which is not registered in the Republic;
319
 to any company of which any of the 
directors or shareholders are not citizens of the Republic;
320
 or to any trust of which any of 
the trustees are not citizens of the Republic.
321
 Again, there is this clear distinction between 
South African citizens and foreign nationals which carries through from the 2017 draft 
regulations.  
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‘Personal purposes’ was widely used in the 2017 draft regulations and was not defined so it 
had the potential to cause enforcement challenges. The finalised regulations now make 
reference to ‘primarily non-commercial purposes’ which is defined but also has the potential 
to be challenging as it essentially still includes private use as a ground to export but extends 
to scientific, enforcement and education purposes too.
322
 The Department attempted to 
provide clarity on what non-commercial purposes mean but the definition is still far too broad 
and will still allow a large number of rhino horns to leave the Republic under the guise of 
‘scientific purposes’ or ‘private use’. This broad definition of ‘non-commercial purposes’ is 
problematic because it has the potential to allow rhino horns to leave the country with a mere 
promise by the person in possession of the horn that it will not be sold commercially. For 
example, the horn could leave O.R. Tambo airport and the person in possession of the horn 
could claim it is for research or scientific purposes. This is too broad – anyone can be said to 
be a researcher or a scientist. There is no cross-checking or follow-ups done once the horn 
reaches its destination.  
As mentioned, the two-horn requirement has been omitted in the final regulations which 
means that there is no limit mentioned on the number of horns that can be taken out of the 
country. This could certainly lead to a cover for illegal exports. In the 2017 regulations, the 
Department tried to apply its mind to this problem by limiting the number of horns that can 
be exported by foreign visitors, however, the limit served more to create an illusion of control 
over the horn trade rather than to restrict horn exports in any meaningful way.
323
 Also, this 
limit does not apply to South African citizens or permanent residents. The issue regarding the 
limitation on the number of rhino horns that can be exported will be discussed from a 
different perspective further below. 
Regulation 2 (4) of the 2017 regulations stated that the regulations must be applied alongside 
TOPS regulations,
324
 CITES regulations
325
 as well as other regulations and public notices. 
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The final 2017 regulations now require them to be read with the Consumer Protection Act,
326
 
NEMA,
327
 the Biodiversity Act,
328
 as well as the TOPS regulations
329
 and CITES 
regulations.
330
  
Streamlining various pieces of law could become challenging as far as enforcement is 
concerned. For example, the 2017 draft regulations 6 (1) and (2) dealt with foreign nationals 
purchasing rhino horn in South Africa and subsequently exporting that horn. According to 
those subsections, a Management Authority from the country of the foreign national would 
need to issue an import permit providing written confirmation that domestic legislation 
provisions are in place in that country.
331
 The Department obviously foresaw the challenges 
that would be faced with the monitoring of those horns once they left South Africa and as a 
result these provision are no longer included in the final regulations. In this context, the final 
regulations seem to regulate foreign nationals and South African citizens in the same way 
with the same requirements applying to everyone.  
The main problem with these regulations is that there is no monitoring of the horn once it has 
left South Africa. There are no monitoring mechanisms in place to ensure that CITES 
provisions are not contravened. For example, the 2017 draft regulations set out the 
requirements to be followed when exporting a horn (specifically the duties of the 
Management Authority) but the final regulations are silent on this issue. Essentially the 
challenge is what becomes of the horn once it has arrived in the destination country and 
whether there is anything South Africa can do about that.  
The 2017 draft regulation 3 (3) established a limit of two horns per person, however, it only 
applied to foreign visitors contemplated in regulation 6 (2) which referred to the procedure of 
obtaining a permit for the export of rhinoceros horn for foreign citizens. This provision has 
been omitted in the final regulations. As is stands, there are seemingly no limits in the final 
regulations regarding number of horns that can be exported for any citizens, residents or 
foreigners owning rhinos in South Africa which implies that such persons can export an 
unlimited number of rhino horns.
332
 Considering that South Africa contains most of the 
rhinos worldwide, it would be unreasonable to limit each individual to a certain number of 
                                                          
326
 Note 9 above, regulation 2 (3). 
327
 Note 9 above, regulation 2 (b). 
328
 Note 9 above, regulation 2 (c). 
329
 Note 9 above, regulation 2 (f). 
330
 Note 9 above, regulation 2 (g). 
331
 Note 2 above, regulations 6 (1) and (2). 
332
 Note 9 above.  
49 
 
horns (such as the previous limit of two horns per person). Johan Hume, for example, is the 
largest breeder of rhinos in the world and exporting two rhino horn (for whatever reason) 
would be highly restrictive. On the other hand, having an unlimited export limit would mean 
that it would be much easier for people like Hume to export large quantities of rhino horn 
under the guise of a donation or a gift or whatever else the regulations contemplate.  
Regulation 13 (6) of the 2018 draft regulations requires that a duly authorised freight agent 
must report on a monthly basis to the Department “the physical address of the recipient of the 
rhinoceros horn in the country of import.” It is submitted that a recipient of rhinoceros horn 
could be anyone – a recipient of rhinoceros horn could be the leader of a trafficking syndicate. 
It is argued that the physical address of the recipient should be that of the person holding the 
permit, it should not be legal for horn to be exported unless it is to be delivered to the original 
purchaser.
333
  
Regulation 4 (6) – in this regulation, and elsewhere in the draft, the term “permit” appears, 
confusingly, to be used to refer to several different documents, issued by different authorities 
for different purposes.
334
 For example, there are requirements for obtaining a permit in 
respect of “buying, receiving, accepting as a gift or donation or any similar way of acquiring 
rhino horn.”335 A person who applies for a permit must at the same time also apply for a 
permit to possess and transport such rhino horn.
336
 Then there are compulsory conditions 
which must be met before permits are issued (separate from the requirements).
337
 It is 
submitted that each type of permit should be specifically named and defined to clarify which 
permits are actually required, by whom they may be issued, and under what circumstances, in 
order to allow enforcement officers to determine whether the permits being presented or 
applied for are the appropriate ones.
338
 
Regulation 5 (1) deals with issuance of a permit in respect of the carrying out of certain 
restricted activities involving rhinoceros horn. It is not clear whether this regulation is 
referring to domestic trade, international export or both.
339
 The regulations should also be 
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much more specific as to which authorities can receive applications and for which purpose. It 
is suggested that there be just one central authority responsible for issuing permits.
340
 This 
point will be picked up in chapter four. 
In summary, these regulations comply with CITES but the concern is how the horns will be 
monitored once they leave South Africa. The regulations attempt to address this through 
regulation 6 which requires a management authority in the country of the foreign national to 
issue an import permit confirming that domestic legislation is in place to ensure that no 
provisions of CITES are contravened. There are no other requirements that are applicable to 
exporting of the horn by South Africans or foreign nationals. It is also crucial for the 
regulations to emphasise and define the meaning of trade in order not to contravene CITES. 
 
3.4. South Africa and CITES 
This paper has discussed the pros and cons of legalising domestic trade from a South African 
perspective. However, it is important to look at this issue from an international perspective as 
well. CITES has been discussed in various sections but this section is specifically going to 
discuss South Africa’s obligations in terms of CITES and the challenges that South Africa 
will face with domestic trade in light of our obligations in terms of CITES.  
The role of CITES is to provide an international framework on the prohibition of the 
international trade in threatened species. When looking at South Africa and CITES, a difficult 
question arises: what role does CITES play in the domestic trade of rhino horn?  From a 
South African point of view, it would seem that this question is easily answered – once a 
treaty has been signed and ratified, South Africa has the option to incorporate the contents of 
that treaty into domestic law, if it has not already. However, the treaty first has to be tabled 
before Parliament which will then decide if it wants to domesticate the treaty. South Africa 
has recently allowed the domestic trade in rhino horn which could prove to be challenging in 
light of our obligations to CITES which is to prevent international trade in rhino horn. Since 
CITES provisions were incorporated into South African law, an on-going challenge has been 
the enforcement of those provisions which has been largely unsuccessful save for the few 
examples where poachers have been brought to justice.  
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A number of issues arise when looking at domestic trade and CITES. As a party to CITES 
South Africa is obliged to incorporate principles of the treaty into its domestic law which it 
then needs to enforce (as discussed above). CITES prohibits trade internationally so it cannot 
regulate what a country decides to do internally. Therein lies the problem. With domestic 
trade now legal, CITES’ anti-trade provisions are weakened by South African trade 
regulations that in effect contradict CITES. This has created a loophole for a number of 
unlawful activities to be conducted, one of which was discussed in 3.3.2 which is that legal 
trade will allow a cover for illegal exports. The 2018 draft regulations in their current form 
are part of the problem as they allow export of rhino horn under the guise of ‘non-commercial 
purposes’ which is defined but in very broad terms. In fact, the term ‘export’ is also not 
defined.  This presents a huge problem for law enforcement officials at entry ports since the 
regulations do allow horns to leave the country subject to the necessary permits being 
obtained.  
Another issue that will arise is enforcement. The draft regulations allow rhino horns to be 
exported (for non-commercial purposes) but how does the country ensure that the horns are 
not sold on the black market? How does the country ensure that the horns will not end up in 
the hands of a syndicate which will thrive off our supply? These are the challenges that South 
Africa is likely to encounter with the trade in domestic horn and our international obligations 
in terms of CITES. There are no easy answers to the above questions and we have to depend 
on the strength and the success of the regulations.  
The next question is how then does South Africa go forward with domestic trade in rhino 
horn in a manner that will not promote international trade and contravene any of the 
provisions of CITES. Two recommendations are provided in 4.3 and will seek to answer 
some of the above questions.  
South Africa will have to be very mindful of CITES and not contravening any of its 
provisions. In the 2016 High Court application by Kruger and Hume discussed in Chapter 2, 
one of the primary reasons the Minister wanted to keep the moratorium was because “the 
moratorium is intended to stem the flow of rhino horn into the international market [which is 
illegal].”341 If South Africa was no longer a part of CITES or if international trade in rhino 
horn was no longer illegal, the Minister would not have any concerns regarding rhino horn 
flowing into the international market.  However, CITES safeguards not only rhinos but also 
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other threatened species as well, which means that our obligations in terms of CITES have to 
be looked at holistically and not just in the context of rhino poaching. It simply would not 
make sense to withdraw from CITES in order for the country to push for international trade in 
rhino horns when CITES currently protects a whole range of threatened and endangered 
species. In addition, the Minister does not want to lift the international trade ban. Despite the 
push by game farmers and private entities for the international trade ban to be lifted, the 
Department’s views were made clear in affidavits filed in the Kruger matter wherein the 
Minister emphasised that “South Africa has both an international and a domestic obligation to 
conserve its biodiversity and to protect threatened and endangered species including 
rhinos.”342 This is very different to the position of Swaziland.  
South Africa, as member state of CITES, would not be able to sufficiently justify 
withdrawing from CITES nor can the country push for the international trade ban to be lifted. 
The Swaziland example – discussed in 3.3.3 above and also briefly discussed below – 
illustrates the difficulty in trying to convince CITES of the benefits of allowing international 
trade in rhino horn. For this reason, CITES is, and will remain to be a strong influence in the 
way that rhino horn trade is going to be managed in South Africa.  
The lines are somewhat blurred though, because while commercial trade is banned by CITES, 
regular non-commercial trade is not. Non-commercial trade being for purposes of exhibitions 
such as zoos or museums, conservation breeding, scientific research or personal use. This is 
the basis on which John Hume was allowed to sell his stockpile of rhino horns during an 
auction in August 2017.
343
 The intention was to sell the stockpile internationally but it is not 
clear under what regulatory system the horns were sold since commercial trade is banned.  
What needs to be established is the role of CITES in protecting South African and African 
rhino. The international ban – as it currently stands – protects African rhino in theory. 
African countries receive little or no financial support from CITES or its member states to 
protect or manage their rhino. As discussed in 3.3.3 above, in 2016 Swaziland was in a 
position where they believed that selling their rhino horn internationally was the best solution 
for them to actually protect and manage their rhino. They intended the proceeds of the sale to 
be reinvested into managing and protecting their rhino. However, at CoP17 CITES parties 
made their views on international trade in rhino horn very clear. The result was that 
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Swaziland was not permitted to sell their rhino horn internationally. This is an example of 
African countries not being ‘allowed’ to manage their own rhino. Koro, an environmental 
journalist rightfully believes that “right now the rhino is not paying for its protection because 
of the international trade ban. If CITES lifts the ban, money generated from selling rhino 
horns would be used for conservation. Currently, Africa is depending on taxpayers’ money 
and a handful of donors to save its rhinos.”344 Koro also firmly believes that African countries 
should no longer be part of CITES so that they can manage their own rhino in order to 
generate income for the continued protection of their rhino.
345
 Koro’s views are extreme and 
misdirected. His passion for protecting rhino is commendable, however, his views do not take 
into account the fact that CITES does not just protect rhinos exclusively, it protects all 
endangered species. If African countries were to withdraw from CITES this could have 
detrimental consequences not only for rhino but many other species as well.  
Conferences of the parties to CITES comprise representatives from animal rights groups as 
well as government representatives.
346
 These animal rights groups influence the votes of the 
government representatives even though they (the animal rights groups) do not have direct 
voting rights.
347
 The difficulty is that many countries that have to deal with poaching and 
conservation often make proposals to CITES on how they think they can better manage their 
wildlife. Unfortunately, CITES outvotes their proposals.
348
  
Sustainable farming and consumptive use of wildlife have been suggested and used in some 
places as a means to conserve wildlife and curb poaching.
349
 Animal rights groups, however, 
oppose this since there is a risk of danger to the animals.
350
 The groups would prefer no use 
of animals at all, in any way except maybe ecotourism.
351
 They oppose “sustainable 
utilisation” which is a way of life in many African countries.352 
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3.5. Summary 
There are various schools of thought which have been discussed and arguments put forth. 
There are also various challenges faced with or without legalisation of domestic trade. 
However, what is clear and remains is that Government has taken steps to make domestic 
trade in rhino horn legal.  
Arguments in favour of legalised trade are that it attracts great economic benefits.
353
 One of 
the main challenges faced by legalised trade, however, is the involvement of crime syndicates 
that exist because of the high prices fetched by rhino horns due to the international trade ban. 
These crime syndicates then take ownership of the illegal trade thereby increasing poaching 
and making conservation difficult.
354
  
The demand for rhino horn is high and the prices are usually fixed with little flexibility. This 
makes enforcement problematic and difficult because the greater the risk of obtaining the 
horn, the higher the price will be and this will not reduce poaching even though supply is 
restricted.
355
 
The above point also implies that balance in trade can be restored if the supply could meet the 
demand.
356
 However, if domestic trade is legalised and demand increases there is a valid 
concern that supply would not be able to meet that demand. Unfortunately, not much is 
known about demand and the factors that affect price and demand. It is submitted that the 
advantages of legal trade do outweigh the disadvantages especially because in South Africa, 
for example, poaching increased during the moratorium.
357
 Domestic legal trade can be 
effective subject to strict regulation  
CITES cannot deal with matters regarding domestic trade, demand reduction strategies and 
supply.
358
 States manage and control their own territories which is known as state sovereignty. 
Sovereignty allows a state to exercise power within a territory without influence from other 
states.
359
 South Africa, therefore, tries to ensure that no other state interferes with the way it 
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exercises its governmental functions within its territory.
360
 It is for this reason that CITES is 
very limiting and cannot contribute to effective conservation. It does not address the 
declining numbers of species and it also does not create any mechanisms or strategies to 
regulate the supply of wildlife products.
361
 The current design of CITES is restrictive rather 
than enabling.
362
 It implies that all trade is bad for conservation and parties do not even begin 
to entertain any proposals that imply otherwise.
363
 Actions taken under CITES promote the 
strict limitations on trade rather than promoting alternative ways of facilitating trade as a 
means of long term sustainability.
364
 
CITES is meant to provide guidance and a legal framework for the regulation of international 
trade but it is not intended to replace domestic control of wild species. This essentially means 
that each state still has the responsibility to manage and control wild species within its 
territory. However, CITES tends to be the only form of international regulation of wild 
species especially in cases where control or regulation is lacking.
365
 
Rhino species currently remain critically threatened and are in need of protection. If demand 
increases in any way, the rhino species could become extinct. Conservation agencies and 
organisations require funding to continue their work of ensuring protection of the rhino 
populations in the field. However, funding is scarce and more often budgets are being 
decreased rather than increased. If high level field protection is reduced because of budget 
restrictions, this could have dire consequences for South Africa’s rhino populations.366 
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CHAPTER FOUR: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE APPROACH 
SOUTH AFRICA SHOULD ADOPT 
 
4.1. Centralised Selling Organisation 
A Central Selling Organisation (CSO) has been suggested by Biggs, Martin and others
367
 to 
monitor trade in rhino horn. Biggs and others propose that “the implementation of a highly 
regulated trading system is through a Central Selling Organisation.” 368  At the outset, 
however, it must be emphasised that the CSO proposed by Biggs et al is regarding sale of 
rhino horn internationally and not just in South Africa. However, it is submitted that many of 
the recommendations provided by Biggs et al could be incorporated and adapted into South 
Africa since South Africa has already legalised domestic trade in rhino horn.  
It is anticipated that a CSO could be established and formalised in terms of the National 
Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act.
369
 The CSO could be an additional function of 
the South African Biodiversity Institute (SANBI)
370
 and could operate as a branch working 
together with the Scientific Authority which is already undertaking much of the work 
expected of the CSO.  
The Scientific Authority is a body that has been established in terms of section 60 of 
NEMBA that “monitors the legal and illegal trade in specimens of TOPS species and CITES 
species.”371 The Scientific Authority also “makes recommendations to issuing authorities on 
applications for permits to undertake restricted activities with TOPS species.” 372  The 
Scientific Authority is supported logistically, administratively and financially by the 
SANBI.
373
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As can be seen, NEMBA already has an established body that attempts to address monitoring 
and reporting issues relating to trade in rhino horns and poaching, however the success of this 
body is not known. It is therefore submitted that a CSO need not be a separate entity but can 
be incorporated into the Scientific Authority with the support of the SANBI. 
Of course, ‘Central Selling Organisation’ implies an entirely separate organisation, but the 
wording could be amended to more adequately reflect its role within the SANBI, however, 
for convenience ‘CSO’ will continue to be used in this dissertation.  
The SANBI has structures in place that would allow for the effective running of a CSO. For 
example, the SANBI is required to report to the Minister on a wide range of biodiversity 
issues.
374
 Part of that report could include issues relating to sales of rhino horn. The CSO 
could also be tasked with managing all rhino horn domestic sales, much like the SANBI is 
currently tasked with managing all of the country’s botanical gardens.375 It is not known, 
however, whether the SANBI would have the capacity for an additional function of managing 
rhino horn sales which is an extremely onerous and high-level function. It is also not known 
whether the SANBI would also be tasked with managing sales and issuing of permits for 
other threatened or protected species. A big challenge that the SANBI would face is that its 
resources will be over-burdened and stretched thin by the additional support which it has to 
provide to the Scientific Authority and the support it would have to provide to the CSO. The 
only way around this is for the department to provide more funds to the SANBI to allow it to 
be the managing body of the Scientific Authority and the CSO. This, of course, can only 
happen if there are surplus funds available for the additional tasks. Perhaps some of the 
money generated from the sale of stockpiles (discussed below) could be used to fund the 
CSO. 
The idea of a CSO as a niche organisation seems to meet the requirements of what is needed 
for the managing of rhino horn sales but would be better suited as part of the SANBI. The 
draft regulations for trade in rhino horn could be amended (assuming they get finalised before 
the CSO is established) to include practical guidance of how the CSO will operate.  
The CSO could also work very closely with government agencies like SANParks, the 
Department of Justice, SARS Customs and the South African Police Service (SAPS). Since 
the CSO would be responsible for managing the sale of rhino horn legally, they could easily 
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alert the relevant authorities when they have information regarding any illegal sales or 
suspicions of rhino horn obtained illegally. Likewise, the SAPS and SARS Customs could 
have access to the CSO database as a way to confirm whether rhino horns were legally 
bought and whether the necessary permits were obtained. This would be the case at the 
airport or at other points of entry and exit that are closely monitored by the SAPS and 
Customs.  
According to Biggs, a CSO would “negotiate and manage the selling of horn so that it would 
be more attractive, reliable and cost-effective for buyers to obtain the product legally than 
through illegal means.”376 He goes on further to add that “a CSO would be supported by and 
accountable to the white rhino range states and the CITES CoP (which includes governments 
of demand countries) for its performance.”377 In South Africa, however, a CSO would be 
accountable to the Minister and to the public at large. The public, including civil society and 
animal rights groups, need to feel at ease with the way rhino are being dehorned. They also 
need to be reassured that the proceeds from rhino horn trade are in fact being used for the 
management and conservation of rhino. CITES is currently evaluating a Central Ivory Selling 
Organisation (CISO) for the management of ivory sales.
378
 Martin et al propose that “the 
CISO would have a dual objective – to obtain the best possible returns for the primary 
stakeholders and to gain control of the market.”379  
A portion of the sales derived from legal trade could fund a CSO and ensure proper 
enforcement of such trade.
380
 The CSO could also ensure that rhino horn harvesting is done 
sustainably in a humane and ethical way and that the land owners and local communities 
where rhino occur benefit from the financial rewards.
381
 
The risks and uncertainties that arise from a legal trade can also be managed by a CSO.
382
 
The most important rule is that horns should be bought legally through the CSO. Stockpiles 
in the possession of registered buyers should be regularly audited and should be processed by 
buyers themselves.
383
 Stockpiles in South Africa – which are currently between 15 and 20 
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tons, could be used to detract buyers away from illegal trade and encourage them to buy 
legally. 
384
 
Further duties of the CSO could be to establish a list of suitable trading partners pre-approved 
by the Organisation and if necessary the Department. However, the main purpose of the CSO 
would be to lessen the administrative burden on the Department which means that the CSO 
will be primarily responsible for vetting of trading partners. The Organisation will need to 
source “willing, compliant, regulated and well-established trading partners”385 which could 
be difficult as there are only a handful of rhino owners and breeders in South Africa and even 
less buyers. The demand for rhino horn is far less in South Africa. 
Once a CSO has been established, “a central information system” would need to be 
established. This system would be linked to the permitting database and also linked to the 
DNA database.
386
 This is crucial as it will provide pertinent information regarding the 
sourcing of rhino horns.
387
 Through this system legally obtained horns can be distinguished 
from illegally obtained horns.
388
 
4.2. Sale of Stockpiles 
This recommendation is largely in favour of the view that South African stockpiles of horn be 
sold in order to attract buyers to legal trade.
389
 Buyers operating illegally would be subject to 
strict penalties imposed by law.
390
 Permits would obviously have to be issued by the 
Government allowing these stockpiles held by private game owners to be sold. Previously, 
stockpiles could not be sold due to the moratorium but now the next step would be for South 
Africa to allow sale of its legal stockpiles of rhino horn provided that this can be managed 
and controlled effectively. This could also possibly assist in reducing the demand for rhino 
horn domestically as the horn would now be available legally. In addition, the money 
generated from sale of stockpiles could be used to fund rhino conservation as well as the CSO 
which would primarily be responsible for monitoring of domestic trade in rhino horn. 
                                                          
384
 Ibid.  
385
 Ibid.  
386
 Ibid.   
387
 Ibid.  
388
 K Brebner ‘Position Statement on Legalising the International Trade in Rhino Horn’ Endangered Wildlife 
Trust available at: 
https://www.ewt.org.za/scientific%20publications/position%20statements/EWT%20Position%20Statement%20o
n%20Legalising%20the%20International%20Trade%20In%20Rhino%20Horn.pdf  Accessed on: 18 November 
2017.   
389
 Biggs et al, note 367 above.  
390
 Ibid.  
60 
 
Ideally, it would be desirable to eradicate illegal sales completely and one way would be 
through sale of stockpiles which would attract legal buyers. This was certainly not the 
motivation behind John Hume’s auction held in August 2017, but it was a step in the right 
direction for legal trade.  The auction, which is the first legal auction in decades, had been 
advertised in Chinese and Vietnamese via Hume’s website.391  Hume had advertised 264 
horns, weighing almost 500kg to local and foreign buyers.
392
 Hume, however, would not 
disclose how many horns he sold or what prices they fetched but the online auction was not 
as successful as he had hoped. Nevertheless, Hume remained confident because “the legal 
domestic trade has now been re-established and the road has been paved for future sales.”393 
This case demonstrates that existing stockpiles can be sold provided that the sale is legal and 
complies with permitting requirements as set out in the regulations. It is also noteworthy that 
the regulations (both 2017 and 2018) have separate chapters dealing with sales of rhino horn 
by auction
394
 which is a further incentive to both sellers and buyers since stockpiles can be 
sold legally to the highest bidder.  
Sale of stockpiles must, however, be approached with caution. The once-off, sale of ivory in 
2008 which was approved by CITES and designed to reduce demand in Asian markets, may 
have unintentionally generated the current demand for ivory which contributed to the current 
crisis and the deaths of 30 000 African elephants annually.
395
 
4.3. Draft regulations to be tightened 
It is submitted that for domestic trade in rhino horn to be effective the necessary controls 
should be in place at a national and provincial level to enable law enforcement and permitting 
staff to regulate domestic trade alongside the existing levels of illegal trade in rhino horn.  
Existing flaws and loopholes need to be addressed and fixed and adequate regulatory 
measures would need to be in place to ensure that South Africa is in compliance with its 
international obligations. These could include: 
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a. “Registering rhino horn stockpiles which have been harvested by private rhino owners;”396 
b. “For each permit issued, a DNA certificate will accompany such permit for each rhino and for 
each horn;”397 
c. “Stockpiles to be audited regularly in order to prevent illegal sales;”398 
d. “Sufficient proof of legal ownership as a prerequisite before a possession permit can be 
issued;”399 and 
e. “Strengthening and increasing of resources at borders to enable border officials to detect 
illegal wildlife products.”400 
An important consideration in light of this recommendation is that in addition to all the 
regulatory systems that will have to be in place, what is needed is for greater clarity to be 
provided on how the income generated from rhino horn will be used. It is argued that rhino 
horn sales would generate extra revenue for improved law enforcement, however, a counter 
argument is that most of the income will go to private farmers (already discussed above) and 
the reality will be that the South African government would have to be responsible for 
funding.
401
 A big challenge with domestic trade in rhino horn is getting the public to buy in. 
Perhaps as a way forward, the department can provide clarity on conservation funding and 
also how income will be distributed between private farmers and government.  
 
4.4. Compliance with CITES 
South Africa must not lose sight of the fact that legalising domestic trade in rhino horn needs 
to be monitored and evaluated closely.  As discussed previously, domestic trade in rhino horn 
makes it more difficult to comply with CITES mainly due to all the loopholes in the draft 
regulations. It must not be forgotten that the country has a strict obligation in terms of CITES 
as a Treaty but also an obligation to the broader CITES international community. With 
domestic trade now legal, how does South Africa maintain compliance with CITES? Two 
suggestions will be discussed briefly below.  
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i). Central Selling Organisation (CSO) 
As discussed in 4.1 above, a CSO could provide a very useful platform for how South Africa 
could continue complying with CITES. The CSO will have first-hand information regarding 
the buying and selling of rhino horn and as such will be able to ensure that these sales are in 
accordance with CITES standards.  
ii). Addressing the Loopholes in the regulations 
The regulations in their current form have various loopholes which could allow or promote 
the illegal sale of rhino horn internationally.  These loopholes have been discussed in 3.3.1 
above. The loopholes and inadequacies will not be discussed again save to say that as the 
regulations currently stand, they provide a cover for illegal exports; for example, in the 2017 
regulation 2 (1) allows rhino horn to be exported internationally for “personal purposes” 
which is not defined in the regulations. The 2018 regulations then changed that to ‘for 
primarily non-commercial purposes’402 and provides a definition which is essentially personal 
use. The regulations attempt to cover all possible concerns regarding the sale of rhino horn, 
but they do not.   
The above two suggestions are provided to assist South Africa stay compliant with CITES, 
however, the consequences of not complying would mean that the country would have a bad 
reputation in the international community as having failed the rhinos. CITES protects rhinos 
as well as other endangered species, so it is not clear whether a failure to uphold the 
principles of CITES would mean South Africa would have to resign.  
CITES does not have any provisions relating to sanctions for violations of any of its 
provisions. However, if the Secretariat has received “information that any species included in 
Appendix I or II is being adversely affected by trade in specimens of that species, it shall 
communicate that information to the authorised Management Authority of the Party or Parties 
concerned.”403 (There is no mention of what happens where the Party is responsible for 
adversely affecting the specimen by trade, for example if South Africa started trading 
internationally in rhino horn).  
Likewise, when any party receives information that specimens of species are being adversely 
affected by trade, it “shall as soon as possible inform the Secretariat of any relevant facts and 
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propose remedial action. If the Party reporting the violation proposes an inquiry, then such 
inquiry must be carried out by one or more persons expressly authorised by the Party.”404 
“The information provided by that Party shall be reviewed by the next Conference of the 
Parties which may make whatever recommendations it deems appropriate.”405 As can be 
seen, CITES places the responsibility on the Parties to include sanction clauses in their own 
domestic legislation for violations, thus its effectiveness lies with each member state.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION  
 
Following the 2016 High Court decision that ordered the Minister to lift the ban on the 
domestic trade in rhino horn, draft regulations regulating trade in rhino horn were published 
by the Minister in February 2017.
406
 Additional draft regulations were published on 21 
September 2018.
407
 These regulations effectively legalise trade in rhino horn in South Africa, 
although it is not clear whether they are binding since the Minister had already been granting 
permits well before the 2017 regulations had been finalised.
408
 The current regulatory 
framework includes a combination of supposedly final regulations and draft regulations in 
one document labelled “draft regulations relating to domestic trade in rhinoceros horn.”409 
There are two schools of thought regarding the legalisation of trade in rhino horn – those that 
are for legalisation and those that are against it. The school of thought in favour of domestic 
trade believe that rhino poaching can be eliminated by legal trade. This will be done by 
meeting the supply legally and eliminating the desire to obtain it illegally.
410
 The school of 
thought against trade believes that by legalising trade the demand for rhino horn will increase 
and the supply will eventually run out causing consumers to revert to obtaining the horn 
illegally.
411
 The reality, however, is that South Africa has legalised the trade and in February 
2017 published draft regulations
412
 for how trade would be regulated.  
One of the main benefits of legalising trade is that buyers will be able to purchase the horn 
legally and avoid the risk of illegal purchase.
413
 Another benefit of legal trade is the 
sustainable use paradigm which advocates for the sustainable use of wild animals due to the 
facts that rhino horns can regrow.
414
 Rhino farm owners like John Hume believe that this is 
one of the best ways to conserve rhino and the proceeds obtained from legal sale of rhino 
horn can be used to further conservation.
415
 This is one of the strongest arguments in support 
of legalisation of domestic trade and is one of the pillars of sustainable use of rhino horn. If 
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rhino horn can be harvested legally and safely, this will prevent merciless killing of rhinos. 
This will also remove the incentive for poachers to kill the animals. It is on this principle that 
legalisation is advanced and the proceeds generated from the sale of these rhinos to be used 
for conservation purposes.  
Another pillar of sustainable development is the involvement of local communities. When 
local communities are involved, there is greater motivation and incentive for them to assist in 
the protection of wild animals since they are more likely to encounter poachers.
416
 The cases 
of the crocodile and the vicuna were discussed as examples of wild animals that were once on 
the brink of extinction but through local support are now flourishing again.  
There are also strong arguments that international prohibition has failed and therefore legal 
trade should be explored domestically.
417
 Trade, however, was legal up until 2009 when the 
Government decided that trade was providing a cover for illegal international exports. We are 
now in the same position we were in pre-2009.  
There are a few things that could be done to strengthen legal trade. However, most 
importantly there is a need for the draft regulations to be tightened. The regulations have 
some flaws, but they are not all that bad.  
One of the major flaws is that rhino horns are allowed to be exported for “primarily non-
commercial purposes” which is defined in the 2018 regulations to mean any purpose that has 
no economic value.
418
 In practice this could mean that a Chinese national can come into 
South Africa, purchase rhino horns legally and then return with them to China under the guise 
of gifts or non-commercial purposes. Secondly, the two-horn requirement from the 2017 draft 
regulations
419
 has been omitted which in effect means that there is no limit on the number 
horns that can be taken out of the country. This is highly problematic as it could lead to horns 
being exported legally but then getting sold on the international black market. Once the horns 
leave South Africa there is no way of tracking them or ensuring that they are in fact gifts or 
they are in fact going to the lawful owner. There are, of course, permitting and export 
requirements which have to be met but the loopholes are large enough to allow horns to be 
exported illegally. It is for this reason that a CSO is suggested with its primary objective 
being the management of rhino horn sales domestically. It would also be responsible for 
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keeping a database of all rhinos purchased legally and ensuring that horns purchased in South 
Africa are tracked right up until they are delivered to the registered owner (if bought through 
an agent). The difficulty is that there really is no way of knowing what happens to the horn 
after it arrives in the destination country. The black market is so advanced and sophisticated 
that even international law enforcement has difficulty tracking the syndicates responsible for 
the illegal sale of the horn.  
Thirdly, there are also issues with the actual export of the horn. Regulation 13 (6) of the 2018 
draft regulations requires that a duly authorised freight agent must report on a monthly basis 
to the department “the physical address of the recipient of the rhinoceros horn in the country 
of import.”420 It is submitted that a recipient of rhinoceros horn could be anyone – a recipient 
of rhinoceros horn could be the leader of a trafficking syndicate. It is argued that the physical 
address of the recipient should be that of the person holding the permit, it should not be legal 
for horn to be exported unless it is to be delivered to the original purchaser. 
Finally, neither the 2017 or 2018 regulations address the issue of safety when removing the 
horns from the rhinos. This is an important aspect which should be included in the regulations 
to complement the existing trade regulations. Trade in rhino horn is not an isolated event and 
the regulations should include provisions governing the initial stages of de-horning right up 
to trade and delivery.  
It is for the above reasons that tightening of the regulations is discussed and offered as a 
recommendation for the way forward. Once the technical flaws have been amended, the 
regulations will be stronger and will succeed in effectively regulating domestic trade in rhino 
horn. It is the regulations that will provide the much needed controls to regulate trade in rhino 
horn. Management of trade is only as good as the regulations which is the legal framework, 
therefore it is of utmost importance to get the regulations tightened.  
Measuring success and effectiveness, however, is often difficult and challenging due to many 
varying factors, one of which is the collection of data which is often difficult to do. It is 
envisaged that a CSO would be in a position to manage and regulate domestic trade and one 
of their core functions would be to keep records of rhino horn bought and sold. This 
information could then be measured against current poaching statistics to reveal whether legal 
trade is in fact reducing poaching.  
                                                          
420
 Note 9 above, regulation 13 (6).  
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The CSO could also assist by ensuring that trade in rhino horn complies with CITES. At 
present, the draft regulations attempt to address potential international trade, but those 
attempts are fairly weak and would need to be strengthened. It can be seen then that the 
establishment and operation of a CSO could address some of the challenges in respect of a 
legalised trade.   
Legal trade can be pursued, provided that the regulations are tightened leaving no room for 
loopholes.
421
 The biggest challenge, however, is always going to be enforcement, so while on 
paper South Africa’s regulatory appears adequate, it is the enforcement of these measures that 
may prove to be unsuccessful. This dissertation did not focus on enforcement, however, on 
paper our law enforcement seems to be adequate in the fight against poaching. Penalties for 
poaching are as high as R5 million for first time offenders and R10 million for subsequent 
offenders
422
 and law enforcement agencies are working well together with farm owners and 
game reserves. In July 2017 the Minister provided statistics that showed law enforcement 
agencies are successfully apprehending and prosecuting offenders.
423
 It would be interesting 
to see whether rhino numbers increase or decrease now that domestic trade has been 
legalised. CITES is often criticised as not being effective in curbing rhino poaching numbers 
so trade in South Africa should be a good indication of whether legalising trade increases or 
decreases poaching numbers, albeit on a national scale.  
As discussed in 3.3.5 above, a number of issues arise when looking at domestic trade and 
CITES. Principles of CITES are incorporated into domestic legislation, however, CITES 
cannot regulate what a country decides to do internally – CITES just regulates international 
trade. With domestic trade now legal, CITES’s anti-trade provisions are weakened by South 
African trade regulations that contradict CITES. This has created a loophole for a number of 
unlawful activities to be conducted, one of which was discussed in 3.3.3 which is that legal 
domestic trade will allow a cover for illegal exports since the regulations in their current form 
are part of the problem as they allow legal exports under the guise of “non-commercial 
purposes.”424  The suggestion of Koro was that African countries should no longer be part of 
CITES so that they can manage their own rhino in order to generate income for the continued 
protection of their rhino.
425
 However, South Africa cannot simply withdraw from CITES as 
                                                          
421
 Heitmann, note 291 above.  
422
 Note 91 above, section 123. 
423
 Department of Environmental Affairs, note 18 above.  
424
 Note 9 above, regulation 1.  
425
 Koro, note 344 above.  
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the Convention applies to different species and not just to rhinos. The underlying challenge 
remains trying to ensure that regulating domestic trade does not infringe on our obligations in 
terms of CITES. 
In addition, enforcement is and will remain a significant challenge. Specific challenges were 
highlighted in 3.3.5 such as how will the country prevent horns from being sold on the black 
market and how will the country ensure that horns will not end up in the hands of black 
market syndicates which will thrive off our legal supply.  
Ultimately, the biggest challenge in terms of CITES is how to regulate the horns once they 
have left the country. The establishment of the CSO, coupled with the tightening of the draft 
regulations, were two suggestions offered to assist in keeping South Africa compliant with 
CITES and attempting to prevent the horns from infiltrating the international black market.  
This process will have to be monitored and evaluated closely. CITES does not have any 
provisions relating to sanctions for violations, however, at the Conference of the Parties, an 
appropriate sanction can be decided by the Parties.
426
  
The biggest problem will always be the underlying reason for poaching, which is the value 
associated with rhino horns. Despite the strict penalties and prison time, poachers are more 
than willing to take any associated risks in acquiring rhino horns. As a result, no matter how 
high the penalties are or how strictly Customs conducts their searches, the desire for rhino 
horns will always be there and therefore the long term solutions provided above will have to 
be implemented to reduce the number of rhinos poached. The only way to control and 
manage poaching is to allow rhino horns to be traded legally in South Africa subject to strict 
enforcement of the regulations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
426
 Note 405 above.  
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